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Federalism and the Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Corruption
BY PETER J. HENNING"
INTRODUCTION
ince the 1970s, federal prosecutors have been particularly active in
prosecuting state and local officials for corruption, even when the
misconduct does not directly affect the federal government. In the past few
years, federal prosecutors have secured convictions of a number of
government officials or former officials, including a former governor,'
former state court judges,2 state legislators,3 mayors,4 city council mem-
bers,5 a former Commonwealth attorney,6 and a variety of officers at all
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Copyright © 2003
Peter J. Henning. I appreciate the comments and suggestions of Ellen Podgor, Tony
Dillof, Bob Sedler, and Dave Moran, and research support from Wayne State
University Law School.
'United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1192 (2003) (Louisiana).
2 United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (California); United
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (Illinois).
'United States v. Serafim, 233 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2000) (Pennsylvania); United
States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998) (South Carolina).
' United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1956 (2003) (Camden, New Jersey); United States v. Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002) (Lyons, Illinois); United States v.
Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2000) (Toa Alta, Puerto Rico); United
States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (Compton, California).
I United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2001) (Jackson, Missis-
sippi); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2001) (Chicago, Illinois);
United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 868 (2001)
(Houston, Texas); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995) (Winston-
Salem, North Carolina).
6 United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 974 (2001) (Kentucky).
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levels of government. Do federal prosecutors invade an area traditionally
reserved to the states by applying federal statutes to local corruption that
does not implicate the exercise of any direct federal power or the misuse of
federal funds?
The question of the federal government's role in enforcing criminal
laws against state and local officials has become especially relevant since
the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez8 and United States
v. Morrison,9 which invalidated federal statutes because they exceeded
congressional authority to regulate in areas already subject to the police
power of the states. The Court relied in part on the principle of federalism
embedded in the constitutional structure to limit Congress' power to
regulate certain types of conduct, specifically crimes of violence.
Federalism is a structural protection inherent in the design of the
Constitution and reflected in the protection afforded by the Tenth
Amendment. 0 Federalism limits the authority of the federal government by
permitting the exercise of only the powers enumerated in the Constitution,
while reserving to the states separate sovereign authority. Federalism
thereby protects the rights of individuals through the division of govern-
mental power at different levels." The Court has stated, "Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."'
' 2
And, as the Court noted in Lopez, "Though on the surface the idea may
'United States v. VanMeter, 278 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2002) (Deputy Commis-
sioner of the Oklahoma State Department of Health); United States v. Fernandes,
272 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2001) (former deputy prosecutor); United States v.
DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659 (3d Cir. 2000) (supervisor of detectives); United States
v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1998) (employees of Detroit Housing Depart-
ment); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (Regional Associate
Director of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission).
' United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
" See Keith Werhan, Checking Congress andBalancingFederalism: A Lesson
From Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1218
(2000) ("Federalism divides power vertically between the national government and
the states.").
12 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
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seem counterintuitive, it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was
enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one. '13
Although federalism is among the fundamental principles of the
Constitution, it has been applied inconsistently and often with substantial
controversy.14 In the past decade, federalism has undergone a revival of
sorts as an additional limit on congressional authority to extend federal
power; drawing on federalist arguments, the Supreme Court has struck
down federal criminal laws it found beyond Congress' power to enact. In
Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the
conduct subject to prosecution-possession of a weapon within 500 feet of
a school-was not economic activity, and therefore fell beyond congressio-
nal authority under the Commerce Clause absent some interstate move-
ment.1 5 As part of its analysis, the Court noted, almost as an aside, that the
states are the "primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law," so that "[w]hen Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between
federal and state criminal jurisdiction.' ,16
In Morrison, the Court explicitly relied on federalism as a rationale for
invalidating the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women
Act, which permitted the plaintiff to bring a federal damages claim for
13 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576.
14 See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's
"Unsteady Path ": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1447, 1447 (1995) ("Like the Supreme Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence, its federalism jurisprudence might, uncharitably, be described as 'a
mess.' "); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 429, 439-40 (2002) ("There is
no agreed-upon definition of constitutional federalism. As a structural principle,
federalism requires that power should be divided among layers of government. As
the Constitution makes plain, the national government was designed to be one of
limited powers, with central responsibilities retained for the states. Beyond these
generalities lie deep disagreements about how precisely the federalism principle
should be specified and implemented.").
15 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
" Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993), and
United States v. Enmans, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)). The Lopez opinion then
quoted from President George H.W. Bush's statement issued when he signed the
legislation containing the Gun-Free School Zones Act that the law "inappropriately
overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law."
Id. (quoting Statement of President George Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act
of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990) (internal
quotations omitted)).
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rape. 7 The cause of action was not predicated on any interstate movement
or other direct effect on commerce." The Court asserted that "[t]he
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.... The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that
is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States."' 9
The understanding of federalism expressed by the Court in Morrison
implied that the Constitution reserves certain subjects to the states to the
exclusion of the federal government, in much the same way that it grants
specified powers exclusively to the federal government. In this sense, the
federal government and the states operate in separate spheres of authority.
By declaring statutes adopted pursuant to the commerce power unconstitu-
tional, the Court in Lopez and Morrison signaled the importance of
imposing limits on the expansion of federal authority, especially in areas
of the criminal law that have long been subject to state and local regulation.
Although the commerce power is broad, Lopez and Morrison reiterate the
proposition that there is no federal police power, so prosecution of crimes
traditionally subject to state and local control may be viewed as violating
the limitations on federal authority imposed by federalism.
A federal prosecution involving a state or local official charged with a
crime such as bribery raises an additional concern: the propriety of one
sovereign's seeking a criminal conviction of a person acting under the
auspices of a different sovereign. In other words, do prosecutors represent-
ing the federal government invade the province of the states, not only by
prosecuting a crime already subject to prosecution by local authorities, but
perhaps more importantly, by policing another government's representa-
tives and employees? Invoking federalism as an independent principle to
limit the federal government's authority to prosecute public corruption at
the state and local level has a superficial appeal.2" Lopez and Morrison refer
to a seemingly inviolable realm of state authority that appears to include
control-perhaps to the exclusion of the federal government--over the
prosecution of "local" crimes. The Court's federalism analysis gives the
" United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605-08 (2000).
18 id.
'9 Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
20 See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the
Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 6 (1996) [hereinafter
Kurland, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction] ("Federal defendants charged with acts
of local political corruption often contend that such prosecutions offend federalism
and related Tenth Amendment principles.").
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impression of separate spheres of control over criminal law, a scheme that
relegates Congress to legislating only in those areas that are obviously
''national" in scope.
Lower federal courts are beginning to rely on the Supreme Court's
federalism statements in Lopez and Morrison to impose limits on the use
of federal statutes to prosecute cases of local corruption. These courts view
federalism as a distinct source of constitutional authority permitting them
to craft limitations on the application of federal corruption statutes. For
example, the Second and Third Circuits cited federalism principles as the
basis for interpreting a federal anti-bribery statute to require proof that the
corruption of state and local government employees somehow affected the
federal interest in the program.21 The circuit courts reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the terms of the statute clearly did not impose such a
requirement for a conviction, and the Supreme Court had seemingly
rejected that very reading of the statute in Salinas v. United States.22
Similarly, a federal district court dismissed an indictment under the same
law because the judge believed that a broad interpretation of its scope
would violate federalism by "mak[ing] it a federal crime to offer $20 to a
local traffic cop in order to avoid a $50 ticket."23 A substantial block of
dissenting judges in the Fifth Circuit called for a reevaluation of the scope
of the Hobbs Act,24 one of the principal statutes employed against state and
local corruption, arguing that the statute's interstate commerce element is
so broad that it reaches local crimes falling beyond the constitutional
authority of the federal government.25
21 See United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1999).
22 Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) ("The prohibition is not
confined to a business or transaction which affects federal funds.").
23 United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 183 (D. Mass. 1998)
(citing United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D. Ind. 1996)).
24 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2003) ("Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.").
25 In United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 155 L. Ed. 515 (2003), the Fifth Circuit divided evenly in affirming Hobbs
Act convictions for four robberies of local stores. The dissenting judges asserted
that the application of the statute exceeded the commerce power:
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The notion of mutually exclusive spheres advanced in Lopez and
Morrison-at least with respect to criminal statutes-overstates the role of
federalism in demarcating the authority of the national and state govern-
To allow such aggregation in Lopez category three cases would, without
adequate justification, bring within the scope of the Commerce Clause the
proscription of local violent (and other) crimes not constituting the
regulation of commercial activity, crimes prototypical of those that
historically have been within the reserved police power of the states,
contrary to the principle that the Commerce Clause is limited to matters that
are truly national rather than truly local.
Id. at 409-10. See Kelly D. Miller, Recent Development, The Hobbs Act, the
Interstate Commerce Clause, and United States v. McFarland: The Irrational
Aggregation of Independent Local Robberies to Sustain Federal Convictions, 76
TUL. L. REv. 1761, 1774 (2002) ("A thorough analysis of the Hobbs Act as it
applies to local robberies in light of Morrison should conclude that there is no
rational basis for finding that these local robberies substantially affect interstate
commerce."). In United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
another Fifth Circuit decision affirming Hobbs Act convictions by an equally
divided court, the dissenting judges stated, "We believe that the[se] Hobbs Act
prosecutions exceeded Congress's authority" because they involved "purely local
robberies." Id. at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge DeMoss
dissented in another Hobbs Act prosecution involving robberies on the ground that
"[s]ooner or later the Supreme Court must either back down from the principles
enunciated in Lopez or rule that the Hobbs Act cannot be constitutionally applied
to local robberies." United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 190 (5th Cir. 1999)
(DeMoss, J., dissenting). Dissenting judges in the Eleventh Circuit raised a similar
concern about the broad application of the Hobbs Act after Lopez, arguing that
"[t]he majority's holding will result in the federalization of any crime involving
extortion to acquire money." United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351, 1358 (1 1th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Birch, J., dissenting). Although these cases all involved
robberies, the Hobbs Act uses the same basis-conduct affecting interstate
commerce--to assert jurisdiction over public corruption as a form of extortion. See
18 U.S.C. § 195 l(b)(1) (2000) ("Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to
do anything in violation of this section" shall be penalized.). To the extent that the
misconduct by a governmental official can be termed "local" rather than "national,"
defendants and judges can raise the same federalism concerns regarding the
application of the statute as the dissenting judges argued in the Hobbs Act cases
involving robberies.
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ments.26 At least with regard to prosecutions involving corrupt officials, the
authority of the federal government to prosecute such crimes advances
rather than undermines the principle of federalism. The Constitution
reflects the deep concern of the Founders with preventing corruption--what
I term the Constitution's "Anti-Corruption Legacy"--a concern that
supports congressional power to reach misconduct by officials at all levels
of government for the misuse of public authority.27
This Article considers the application of federalism to determine the
constitutionality of federal statutes used to prosecute corruption of state and
local officials. My thesis is that the Anti-Corruption Legacy of the
Constitution supports a broad view of the federal government's power to
prosecute public corruption at all levels of government. Federal prosecution
of corruption does not invade the sovereignty of the states because
corruption undermines the balance established by federalism, and the
26 See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard
of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 87-88 (2001) ("Certainly the graveyard of
failed distinctions that these efforts left behind-'commerce' versus 'police'
regulation, 'inherently national' versus 'inherently local' matters, 'manufacturing'
or 'mining' versus 'commerce,' 'direct' versus 'indirect' effects-does not speak
well for the judicial ability to develop doctrinal limits on national power that are
at once meaningful and workable."); Roderick M. JIills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty"Doesn't, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 813, 938 (1998) ("[T]he Court has relied
... on palpably untrue statements that the federal and state governments operate
in separate, independent, and mutually exclusive spheres.... ."); Kurland, Federal
CriminalJurisdiction, supra note 20, at 61 ("[T]he substantive federal criminal law
was potentially very broad in scope. It necessarily would overlap with state
criminal jurisdiction to varying, and significant, degrees. This much was accepted.
So much for a notion of a rigid dual federalism and the demarcation of exclusive
spheres ofjurisdiction in the criminal law context."); Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 206 ("There is no
thing out there called 'tradition' that lower courts can look to to sort out just what
objects of regulation should be federal and which local. And because there is
nothing out there to guide the courts, courts will be guided to different conclu-
sions."); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future ofFederalism,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 27 ("[E]nclaves of exclusive state authority ...are
exceptionally difficult to sustain because they frequently overlap with areas in
which federal authority is unquestioned.").
27 See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 430 (1984) ("In revolutionary ideology,
corruption of the legislature by the executive was the way in which the people were
deprived of liberty: 'a corrupt and prostituted ministry' was what had sought to
'enslave' Americans. Care to prevent such corruption could scarcely not have been
a care of the constitution-makers.") (internal citation omitted).
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national government must protect the integrity of both sides of the
federalism equation. The constitutional design to eliminate corruption
demonstrates the Framers' intent to guard against the threat to liberty from
the misuse of public authority.
The Anti-Corruption Legacy does not provide Congress with the power
to adopt legislation, so federal statutes used to prosecute corruption of state
and local officials must also be an exercise of one of Congress' enumerated
powers. It is important, therefore, first to identify the constitutional basis
for provisions used to combat public corruption. In analyzing Congress'
constitutional power to enact a statute, the Anti-Corruption Legacy
supports a broad interpretation of congressional authority to reach the
conduct of state and local officials, regardless of whether the crime could
also be prosecuted by the state.
My analysis rejects the position taken by some lower federal courts that
federalism limits the authority of Congress or federal prosecutors to target
corruption involving state and local officials. The use of federalism to
curtail these corruption prosecutions is misguided because the individual
liberty afforded by federalism is enhanced when the integrity of govern-
ment is protected through federal prosecution. If the Constitution's
Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to adopt a statute that can
be used to prosecute corruption, then state and local officials charged with
corruption should not be empowered to argue that their conduct somehow
falls outside the federal government's power because of federalism.28 The
Supreme Court has rejected some federal statutes that largely duplicate
crimes prosecuted by the states, such as the possession of weapons near a
school or rape.29 Federal prosecutions of state and local officials' corrupt
conduct, however, are distinguishable from the Lopez and Morrison
prosecutions, not because they do not duplicate state offenses (surely
bribery is prohibited under state laws), but instead because public
corruption poses a unique threat to the federalist structure by impugning the
exercise of public authority. Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the
2 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). Rejecting the defendant's
argument that state legislators should be accorded a privilege similar to the U.S.
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause for federal elected officials, the Court held
that "[i]n the absence of a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to
make state officials, like all other persons, subject to federal criminal sanctions, we
discern no basis ... for a judicially created limitation that handicaps proof of the
relevant facts." Id. at 374.
29 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
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Violence Against Women Act, therefore, federal statutes used to prosecute
public corruption are not an improper extension of the authority of the
national government into affairs reserved to the states. Instead, they are
consistent with the structure of the Constitution and a fundamental aspect
of the guarantee of liberty embodied in federalism.
Part I of the Article reviews the Anti-Corruption Legacy of the
Constitution as support for broad congressional authority to enact
legislation to prosecute state and local officials for corruption, even if that
corruption does not directly affect the federal government.Y' Part II analyzes
the constitutional authority of Congress to adopt the four principal federal
statutes used for prosecuting corruption: 18 U.S.C. § 201,31 18 U.S.C.
§ 666,32 the Hobbs Act," and the Mail Fraud statute.34 I argue that, in light
of the Constitution's Anti-Corruption Legacy, these statutes are a proper
exercise of Congress' authority to pass laws maintaining the integrity of
every level of government. Individual corruption prosecutions should not
be prohibited out of a misguided concern that federal prosecution somehow
denigrates the sovereignty of the states.
I. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution reflects a significant concern with preventing
corruption in all levels of the government. There is a powerful Anti-
Corruption Legacy in the Constitution that prevents misuse of federal office
for personal gain and, importantly, furnishes protections to limit the effects
of corruption occurring in the states. For example, the two crimes
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution as forming the basis for impeach-
ment are treason and bribery, both of which involve the abuse of public
authority by a federal officer." The Constitution prohibits the President and
members of Congress from taking advantage of their positions to realize
economic benefits, at least during their term in office,36 and prevents
31 See infra notes 35-66 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 96-201 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 202-27 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 228-67 and accompanying text.
35 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
36 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during
the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the
authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
2003-2004]
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federal officials from accepting "any present, emolument, office, or title,
of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state."37
Beyond concerns with misconduct by federal officials, the Constitution
embodies protections against corruption at the state and local level. Article
III authorizes federal court jurisdiction in suits between citizens of different
states, a scheme which has traditionally been understood as a protection
against judicial prejudice in favor of local litigants.38 That prejudice was
not just a regional bias, but also involved the problem of local control of
judicial appointments, which could result in a corrupt outcome in favor of
those who appoint judges and provide for their salaries. Similarly, the
absence of a right to a jury trial in civil cases was a major stumbling block
for proponents of the Constitution during the ratification debates in the
states. Although the Constitution guaranteed the right to a jury in criminal
cases, the Anti-Federalists sought to extend this right to the civil case
context. They argued that the Constitution's failure to provide jury trials in
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("The President shall, at
stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be
encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected,
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them."). The prohibition in the Congressional Emoluments Clause
is one honored more in the breach; NOONAN, supra note 27, at 433 (The prohibi-
tion on emoluments was "[a] distinctly modest barrier to corruption of Congress"
and "[i]t was to be eventually flouted with impunity by Senator Hugo Black and
President Franklin Roosevelt, who appointed Black to the Supreme Court after the
Justices' emoluments had been increased while Black was a legislator."); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 907, 908
(1994) (The Congressional Emoluments Clause "is one that people today regard as
a nuisance."). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment prohibits members of Congress
from accepting a pay raise until after the next election. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII
("No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Represen-
tatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have inter-
vened.").
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -- to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; --to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party; -- to Controversies between two or more States; -- between a State
and Citizens of another State; -- between Citizens of different States. ... ").
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civil cases might expose litigants to corrupt outcomes, since a single
officer's decision would more likely be biased than would the collective
decision of a jury.39 Many states provided for juries in civil cases, but the
Framers were unable to agree on how to protect the right given the diversity
of state procedures.40 Ultimately, however, the preservation of the jury trial
in some federal civil cases prevailed in the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment.4
The Anti-Corruption Legacy of the Constitution, like federalism,
suggests that a balance between different levels of government will protect
the liberty of the people by preventing one level from usurping the
authority of the other.42 Corruption in any government undermines that
balance by permitting individuals to purchase an outcome or by allowing
public officials to misuse their authority for personal benefit, resulting in
39 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Matthew P.
Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 IOWA L. REV.
145, 149 (2002) ("The absence of any provision for civil jury trials in the
Constitution moved concerns about juries to the forefront of the debate over the
future of the new nation. Already suspicious about the scope and breadth of the
powers to be given the new government, antifederalists complained that the framers
of the Constitution had debased one of the most cherished defenses against
governmental oppression.").
' See Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1014 (1992) ("Ultimately, the
Federal Convention's proposed Constitution simply did not speak to civil jury trial
rights at all. One recorded comment from the convention reinforces Hamilton's
view of why this happened. That comment is from General Pickney (responding to
Mr. Gorham), who (according to Madison's notes) argued that given the lack of
uniformity ofjury practice among the states, a constitutional clause preserving jury
rights in civil cases would be 'pregnant with embarrassments.' This comment
certainly suggests that the omission of a civil jury clause was intentional and at
least in part related to the inability of the delegates to say what the Constitution
should require." (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
628 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
42 Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("As we have
repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal system of Government so that the
people's rights would be secured by the division of power."); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.").
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considerable social costs. The Constitution embodies the federal govern-
ment's significant interest in protecting against any form of public
corruption, whether at the national, state, or local level. Viewing federal
prosecution of state and local officials for corruption as an invasion of state
authority would turn the values advanced by federalism on their head.
Federalism protects states, and thereby individuals, from oppression by the
national government, but it does not permit public authority to be exercised
corruptly, harming both the state and its citizenry by insulating non-federal
officials from federal criminal prosecution. The Constitution incorporates
federalism to enhance the lives of individuals by making government work
better---not by permitting some officials to misuse their power. Corruption
is not a matter solely of state concern, reserved for the police powers of the
states, but is instead a national concern that falls within the interests of the
federal government.
A. Corruption and the National Government
The framers' concern with corruption led to the adoption of a number
of provisions in the Constitution limiting the opportunities for self-
enrichment. The Constitution provides for the removal of the President and
other federal officials by impeachment for "Treason, Bribery, and other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."43 During the Constitutional Convention,
one draft of the impeachment provision permitted removal of executive
branch officers for "neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption." 4 Another
formulation proposed to authorize impeachment for "treason, bribery, or
corruption"--language closer to the final form adopted by the Constitu-
tional Convention. 4' Arguing in favor of permitting the legislature to
impeach the President, Governour Morris asserted that "corruption [and]
some few other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable....
James Madison noted that "[i]n the case of the Executive Magistracy which
was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was
more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be
fatal to the Republic. 47
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
44 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at
337.4 1Id. at 186.
4Id. at 65.47 Id. at 66. The first debate on impeachment at the Constitutional Convention
centered largely on the propriety of providing a means to remove the President, not
on the potential grounds for impeachment. Although the Constitution provides a
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While impeachment permits the removal of officers after the discovery
of corruption, other constitutional provisions impose structural protections
designed to limit the possibility of corruption in the federal government.
The President's compensation "shall neither be encreased nor diminished
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or
any of them., 4' The Constitution also prohibits anyone holding "any Office
of Profit or Trust... without the Consent of the Congress, [from accepting]
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State. 49 Members of Congress are subject to a
structural provision designed to prevent them from exploiting their offices
for personal gain; the Constitution prohibits their appointment to any
federal office "which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been encreased during such time" that the member was in
office." The Appropriations Clause5 requires congressional authorization
before an agency can disburse federal funds, thereby creating a check on
the Executive's authority to spend funds that could be used to corrupt the
legislature.52 These provisions were designed to prevent corruption of
federal officers who might be swayed in the execution of their duties by the
transfer of a benefit or the incentive to reap a reward related to their
specific definition of treason, see U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3, cl. 1, and empowers
Congress to adopt criminal laws on counterfeiting, piracy, and felonies committed
on the high seas, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10, there is no other reference
to bribery beyond its inclusion as a ground for impeachment.
48 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. An emolument is defined as "[a]ny advantage,
profit, or gain received as a result of one's employment or one's holding of office."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (7th ed. 1999). The first part of the Emoluments
Clause ensures presidential independence from the legislature; in the second part,
"[tjhe Framers of the Constitution forbade the President from receiving any
emolument other than a fixed compensation, in part because they feared the
consequences of allowing a President to convert his or her office into a vehicle for
personal profit." Griffin v. United States, 935 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995).
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. .. ").
52 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 501, 509 (2002) ("The Appropriations Clause blocks any
symmetrical distribution ofcompensation authority across branches; its background
is the similar concern of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British Parliaments
that an executive with access to the treasury as well as to offices could corrupt
legislators and free itself from popular oversight.").
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office.53 The prohibitions reach conduct beyond simple bribery because
they bar absolutely the receipt of the benefit, regardless of the circum-
stances. The Constitution's categorical approach to potential corruption
goes beyond what any particular criminal law prohibiting bribery or an
unlawful gratuity could accomplish.
In addition to the original text of the Constitution, amendments have
been adopted in response to corruption, or at least the appearance of
corruption. The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election
of senators, resulted from a general perception that elections in the state
legislatures were tainted by vote-selling and the control of corrupt local
party machines.54 Although there was no compelling evidence of wide-
spread corruption in the legislatures, proponents of the Seventeenth
Amendment viewed it as a significant means to make the election process
less susceptible to the corrosive influence of campaign contributions and
other unseemly practices. 55
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, approved by Congress with the other
amendments in the Bill of Rights in 1789 but not ratified by the states until
1992, prohibits any change in the compensation of members of Congress
from taking effect until after the next general election. 6 The Amendment
53 See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (noting that
the prohibition in Article I, § 6, on members of Congress from holding other
offices if they were created or had the salary increased during their term of office
"was generated out of a fear that corruption would result if the legislature
multiplied the number or increased the salaries of public offices for the benefit of
its own members").
" See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the
Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 538-39
(1997) ("By the early 1890s, as the reform movement gained momentum, there was
a general perception that senatorial elections had been bought and sold, that 'men
have gained seats in the Senate of the United States whom the people of their State
would never have chosen to go there, and who never would have gone there but
[f]or the corrupt use of money to secure their election."' (quoting 23 CONG. REC.
6066 (1892) (statement of Rep. Bushnell)).
'5 But see id. at 540 ("The proponents of the Amendment had brought forth
evidence of corruption, but they had failed to show that it resulted from the
structure of the present mode of election and that structural change in the mode of
election would cure the problem.").
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened."). As one author put it quite well, "This one
kind of sneaked up on everybody." Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of
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anticipated the corruption problems that might result if legislators had the
capacity to set their own pay. 7 The Twenty-Seventh Amendment enhances
the risk of electoral defeat if Congress decides to increase its own salary,
effectively requiring that a strong case for the increase must be made to the
electorate to demonstrate that the higher pay is appropriate. 8
B. Protection Against Corruption in the States
The Constitution has direct measures to limit corruption in the national
government, but it does not operate directly on the states except through the
grant of certain exclusive powers, none dealing specifically with corruption
by state officers. The Framers provided certain structural protections,
however, to deal with the possibility of corruption or the misuse of author-
ity in the states. The most such protection is the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of a jury trial in specified civil cases, especially those based on
diversity jurisdiction, where corruption at the state level would have its
greatest effect.
The Constitution did not provide explicitly for jury trials in civil
cases--only criminal prosecutions-and the Anti-Federalists attacked the
absence of such a guarantee in the ratification debatesi 9 In the Constitu-
tional Convention, Elbridge Gerry argued in favor of a civil jury trial right
"to guard [against] corrupt Judges., 60 Alexander Hamilton conceded that
Article V.- The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1993).
" See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy ofthe
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 501 (1992) ("To the
Americans, the ostentatious purchase of Parliamentary seats.., and the often bla-
tant vote-buying attending elections ... exemplified the extraordinary corruption
that tainted the British constitutional system.... Guarding against such real or per-
ceived corruption, colonial and state governments early on assumed the responsibil-
ity for paying the salaries of their members."); see also Vermeule, supra note 52,
at 517 ("Perhaps the Amendment is a redundant safeguard against legislative self-
dealing, but well designed systems often contain redundant protections against
failures thought sufficiently damaging.").
58 In proposing the Amendment in the First Congress, Madison stated that
"there is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without control to put
their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets; there
is a seeming indecorum in such power, which leads me to propose a change." 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 457-58 (Joseph Gates ed., 1834).
9 See supra note 39.
60 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 587.
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there was some benefit in the jury trial while arguing for ratification of the
Constitution, stating:
The strongest argument in its favour is, that it is a security against
corruption. As there is always more time, and better opportunity, to
tamper with a standing body of magistrates, than with a jury summoned
for the occasion, there is room to suppose, that a corrupt influence would
more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.61
The adoption of the Seventh Amendment reflects a concern with possible
corruption at the local level, and providing a right to a jury in civil cases
limits the effect of that corruption in federal cases.
The jury trial right does not provide any direct protection against
corruption in state courts. The Constitution does permit federal courts to
hear cases that would otherwise come before state courts when there is
diversity jurisdiction between residents of different states, which was
another means of protecting individuals against corruption. The usual
explanation for the constitutional grant of federal diversity jurisdiction is
that it would protect out-of-state litigants against local prejudice by
permitting them to bring cases in federal courts, which presumably would
not be as susceptible to local pressure.62 One reason a federal court could
provide a fairer hearing was the protection enjoyed by federal judges of
lifetime tenure and undiminished compensation.63 The problem does not
appear to have been that litigants from outside the state would suffer
prejudice solely because of their status as non-residents; instead, drafters
feared that local litigants would have greater influence over the judicial
appointment process and state courts, therefore, could not necessarily be
trusted to view the parties fairly. As noted by Judge Henry Friendly, "[A]
careful reading of the arguments of the time will show that the real fear was
61 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001). See Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 710 (1973) ("On this ground
alone [Hamilton] was prepared to give it a constitutional guarantee, except for the
insunrountable problem of drafting a suitable constitutional provision.").
62 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 142 (1994) ("The
traditional explanation for the creation of diversity jurisdiction is a fear that state
courts would be prejudiced against those from out of state.").
63 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges... shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
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not of state courts so much as of state legislatures., 64 The method of
appointing state judges-specifically the role of the legislatures in seeking
to influence the outcome of cases through judicial appointments and salary
decisions--meant that local courts could not be counted on to routinely
render unbiased decisions. The protections supplied to federal judges limit
the possibility of bias because they would be largely free from the pressure
to respond to the body that sets their salary and appoints them, or removes
them from office.65
The protection against corruption provided by diversity jurisdiction and
the right to a jury trial is indirect, in that not every litigant could be
provided with access to federal courts. Such a result would have been
highly problematic, given the suspicions about the authority of the federal
courts and the desire of the states to defend their prerogatives. Diversity
jurisdiction did not eliminate corruption in the states, but it created a
structural means to allow some cases to proceed before a judge who would
not be dependent on the state for support. Any judicial officer could be
bribed, and the Constitution could do little to prevent that misconduct. The
need to insulate the courts from extraneous pressure, and to provide relief
in those states that did not, was one impetus for diversity jurisdiction. The
Constitution recognized that corruption could have a pervasive impact, so
it provided one measure--albeit only an indirect one--to mitigate the
potential corruption of state court judges unduly influenced by state
legislatures.66
4 Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 483, 495 (1928); see also Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928) ("The
real fear was of state legislatures, not of state courts.").
65 See Friendly, supra note 64, at 497 ("In Connecticut the members of the
Council appointed all the judges and then did not hesitate to appear as advocates
before them."); John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory
Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1660-61 (2001)
("Moreover, state legislatures-identified at the time with popular sover-
eignty--tended to exercise dominion over the courts, whatever the formal
assurances proffered by the state constitutions."). Professor Manning reviews how
courts in a number of states were subject to indirect legislative control, noting that
"[s]tate legislatures sometimes vacated judicial proceedings, granted exemptions
from standing law, prescribed the law to be applied to particular controversies, and
even decided the merits of cases." Id. at 1661-62.
66 The Guarantee Clause affords a further protection against corruption and the
misuse of authority in the states by providing, "The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...... U.S. CONST.
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art. IV, § 4. The states could not revert to a monarchy or other type of dictatorial
system. The Constitution protects the states from federal interference with the
conduct of their affairs so long as they meet the definition of a republican
government, but the Guarantee Clause does not provide the states with complete
autonomy from federal interference. James Madison described how the Guarantee
Clause protected against a broad array of systemic abuses of authority beyond just
the form of government in the states: "But who can say what experiments may be
produced by the caprice of particular states, by the ambition of enterprising leaders,
or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers?" THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at
225 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
Alexander Hamilton noted that the Clause protects the citizenry from "ambition of
powerful individuals in single states, who might acquire credit and influence
enough, from leaders and favourites, to become the despots of the people... ." Id.
No. 85, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001). Although the states controlled the means for appointing or electing their
leaders, their power was not unfettered because the federal government received
the authority to ensure that the states did not abuse their power to such an extent
that they violated the rights of individuals or descended into a form of tyranny. See
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
For a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 55 (1988) ("The guarantee clause thus
demarcates only a modest area of state control over the qualifications of govern-
ment employees. The clause shields only workers who exercise legislative,
executive, or judicial power. Even with respect to these employees, the states may
not adopt criteria for selection that violate other constitutional provisions; nor may
they retain employees who have violated the constitutional rights of others.").
By permitting a federal role in ensuring the integrity of state governments, the
Guarantee Clause reflects the Founders' concern with misuse of authority by the
states. True to the principle of federalism limiting the authority of each level of
government, the clause protects individual liberty by ensuring that the states do not
become completely riddled with corruption. The national government has a very
restricted authority to interfere in the administration of the state governments,
triggered only by systemic misuse of state authority that undermines the legitimacy
of the exercise of official power. The federal concern is that abuse of authority
should not reach a level that would result in the destruction of the state government
by a tyrannical leader. The Constitution recognizes the national government as the
ultimate protector of the citizenry from widespread misuse of authority in the
states, perhaps the ultimate form of corruption. See Adam H. Kurland, The
Guarantee Clause as a Basis for FederalProsecutions of State and Local Officials,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 431 (1989) [hereinafter Kurland, Guarantee Clause]
("[T]he guarantee clause embodies a collective guarantee to the citizenry of
republican government. Accordingly; the federal guarantee should extend to
combatting state and local corruption because official corruption directly threatens
the essential features and the true 'republican' nature of the American governmen-
tal system.").
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Hl. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
FOR FEDERAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STATUTES
The Constitution's Anti-Corruption Legacy demonstrates that the
Founders were concerned with systemic corruption and, to the extent
possible in a federal system that permitted the states to retain significant
sovereign authority, sought to limit its effects. That Legacy does not,
however, provide an independent constitutional grant of authority to the
national government to adopt particular legislation to address corruption.
The Anti-Corruption Legacy is instructive in interpreting the scope of
congressional authority to address corruption at both the federal and state
levels. The Constitution bestows on Congress broad power to address the
issue, but it is not an unlimited grant of authority to enact any form of
legislation to deal with corruption. A criminal statute that authorizes federal
prosecution of corruption still must be an exercise of one of the enumerated
powers granted to Congress. The Founders' awareness of corruption and
their adoption of provisions to limit its effect at both the national and state
levels, demonstrate that the use of federal power to attack the misuse of
governmental authority by public officials would not be an improper
extension of the constitutional power granted to Congress to regulate in
specific areas. Fighting corruption is a significant national interest, without
regard to the source of the authority abused or the level of government
affected by the misconduct.
There is no single federal anti-corruption statute applicable to state and
local officials,67 so prosecutions are brought under a variety of provisions
enacted pursuant to different sources of constitutional authority, none of
which explicitly authorizes the adoption of criminal statutes.6" The Postal
Clause69 and the Commerce Clause7" are authority for the Mail and Wire
67 There have been efforts in the recent past to adopt a broad federal anti-
corruption law applicable to all government officials, but Congress has not enacted
the legislation. See The Anti-Corruption Act, S. 327, 101stCong. (1989), reprinted
in 135 CONG. REC. 1064. Congress instead relies on a piecemeal approach under
which different provisions reach various forms of corruption without providing a
single statute targeting corrupt conduct at all levels of government.
68 Corruption of federal officials is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 209
(2000), enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18. Although the federal government must be able to protect itself by
prosecuting those who abuse its authority, the Necessary and Proper Clause does
not provide Congress with a general police power to adopt criminal laws.
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
7 1 Id. at cl. 3.
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Fraud statutes, 71 which reach corrupt schemes involving a breach of
fiduciary duty for personal gain. Through an exercise of the Commerce
Clause power, the Hobbs Act prohibits the receipt of bribes by any public
official. 72 The source of congressional authority to enact 18 U.S.C. § 66671
to prosecute bribery of officials working in programs or entities that receive
more than $10,000 in a twelve-month period from the federal government
is assumed to be an exercise of the Spending Clause,74 but the analysis of
that source of authority is largely conclusory.
Among the earliest federal criminal statutes was a prohibition on
bribing customs officers. This measure served as a means of protecting the
principal source of the national government's revenue. Although the
Constitution did not grant Congress explicit authority to enact such a
prohibition, there is no question that the sovereign can protect itself against
the corruption of its officers by enacting criminal penalties for those who
offer or take bribes to influence the exercise of authority.75
A. Bribery of Public Officials: 18 U.S.C. § 201
The most obvious form of corruption is bribery, which involves the
offer and receipt of something of value for the purpose of influencing the
exercise of authority.76 The first federal criminal law prohibited bribery of
71 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (Mail Fraud) & 1343 (Wire Fraud) (2000).
721 Id. § 1951(b)(2).
731 Id. § 666.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667
(2000), Justice Thomas asserted in his dissent that § 666 was adopted pursuant to
the Spending Clause. See id. at 689.
75 Even without a statutory basis for the prosecution of corruption, the federal
government relied on the common law to indict a defendant for offering a bribe to
the Commission of the Revenue, whose office was not covered by the early anti-
bribery laws adopted by Congress. See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
384, 390 (1798) (holding that criminal statutes prohibit bribery of judges and
customs officers, "[b]ut in the case of the Commissioner of the Revenue, the Act
constituting the office does not create or declare the offence" of bribery).
76 See NOONAN, supra note 27, at xi ("The core concept of a bribe is an
inducement improperly influencing the performance of a public function meant to
be gratuitously exercised."); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 786 (1985) ("[T]he crime
of bribery is the black core of a series of concentric circles representing the degrees
of impropriety in official behavior. In this conception, a series of gray circles
surround the bribery core, growing progressively lighter as they become more
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customs officers,77 and the proscription on bribing federal officials has been
a staple of federal law ever since. Congress adopted sections 201 through
218 of Title 18, the primary federal criminal code, in 1962 as part of a set
of comprehensive anti-corruption provisions for federal officials and those
who exercise federal authority." The law, inter alia, prohibits bribery of
federal employees and of those "acting for or on behalf of the United States
.. in any official function."79 The statute does not require proof of a
jurisdictional element except for the status of the defendant as a "public
official."8 The Supreme Court has noted that § 201 is a proper exercise of
the sovereign's inherent authority to protect its functions.8 The Necessary
and Proper Clause, which provides that Congress may "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers,"82 is the constitutional source of authority to enact a
distant from the center, until they blend into the surrounding white area that
represents perfectly proper and innocent conduct.").
77 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 46-47.
78 See Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119-26 (1962). The law streamlined a
number of anti-corruption and conflict of interest provisions in the federal criminal
code into one set of laws. In addition to the prohibition on bribery and unlawful
gratuities prohibition, the law prohibited federal officials from receiving payments
in addition to their governmental salaries, see 18 U.S.C. § 203 (2000), and
restricting former federal officials from appearing before the agency where they
worked for a certain period of time, see 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
" 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). The act prohibits both bribery and the receipt of
unlawful gratuities by any "public official," which is defined as a "Member of
Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official
has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the
United States, or any department, agency, or branch of Government thereof,
including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority
of any such department, agency, or branch of Government ... ." Id. § 201 (a)(1).
The criminal prohibition applies to every federal employee regardless of whether
they are in a supervisory position or exercise discretionary authority. See United
States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The fact that Baymon [a
cook foreman at a federal penitentiary] was a federal employee with official
functions is sufficient ... to find he is a public official.").
80 18 U.S.C. § 201.
sI See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500-01 (1984) (In a § 201 case
involving the petitioners' abuse of their authority to allocate federal housing grants
by accepting bribes from contractors, the Court found, "The federal government
has a strong and legitimate interest in prosecuting petitioners for their misuse of
government funds.").
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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criminal law punishing misuse of federal authority. Although that provision
does not usually constitute a separate grant of power to Congress to adopt
a law, 3 the Clause empowers Congress to go beyond the text of the
enumerated powers by adopting regulations-including criminal statutes-
that are a necessary concomitant to the exercise of its sovereign authority.
84
An anti-corruption statute enacted to punish those who seek to pervert
the exercise of federal authority through the offer and receipt of a bribe is
certainly a reasonable exercise of the federal government's authority.
Nevertheless, there is no textual authority for Congress to adopt such a
statute, although the federal courts have enforced similar proscriptions
since the formation of the United States. 5
The increasing number of state and local programs funded, at least in
part, by the federal government in the 1970s raised the question of whether
§ 201 could be used to police corruption at the local level. In Dixson v.
United States,86 the defendants challenged their convictions under § 201 for
accepting bribes related to the defendants' distribution of federal funds to
a local social service organization designated to administer federal block
grants for housing. The defendants were officials of a local organization
funded by the federal government, but they were neither employees of the
federal government nor parties to any contract with it. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the defendants fell outside the jurisdictional
boundaries of § 201, holding that they could be prosecuted under the law
because a "public official" includes any person who "occupies a position
83 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal
Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
274-75 (1993) ("An exercise of the Sweeping Clause power must always be tied
to the exercise of some other identifiable constitutional power of the national
government.").
14 ChiefJustice Marshall's seminal analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), relied on federal
criminal laws as a paradigmatic example of the type of congressional acts
authorized by the Constitution even though the enumerated powers do not
specifically authorize them. "So, with respect to the whole penal code of the United
States: whence arises the power to punish, in cases not prescribed by the constitu-
tion?" Id. at 416. The answer was the Necessary and Proper Clause. See JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.2 (6th ed. 2000)
("Because the framers intended the nation to endure, the federal government had
to have the normal discretionary powers of a sovereign so that Congress could
choose how to best effectuate national goals.").
85 See, e.g., United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798) (receiving a
prosecution for attempted bribery of the Commissioner of Revenue).6Dixson, 465 U.S. at 482.
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of public trust with official federal responsibilities," regardless of whether
there was an employment or other direct agency relationship.87 The Court
noted that the statute required proof that the defendant actually carried out
federal policy, although merely administering a program that received some
federal funds, standing alone, would not establish that a person was a
"public official" under § 201.88
Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's broad reading of "public
official" on the ground that federalism imposed a separate limit on the
scope of the statute. She argued that "[a] proper respect for the sovereignty
of States requires that federal programs not be interpreted to deputize States
or their political subdivisions to act on behalf of the United States unless
such deputy status is expressly accepted or, where lawful, expressly
imposed."8 9 This dissent was the first mention of federalism as a potential
limit on the authority of the federal government to reach corruption at the
state and local level, and it hinted that federalism might impose a limit on
federal power separate from the question of the statute's jurisdictional
reach.9°
Dixson shows that the national government's authority to prosecute
corruption is not limited to those defendants who have a formal employ-
ment relationship with the federal government; the federal government may
punish state or local corruption that threatens the integrity of specific
federal programs.9 Extending § 201 to cover the conduct of local officials
87 d. at 496. The Court noted with approval that "[f]ederal courts interpreting
the federal bribery laws prior to 1962 had generally avoided formal distinctions,
such as the requirement of a direct contractual bond, that would artificially narrow
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 494.
88 Id. at 499 ("[W]e do not mean to suggest that the mere presence of some
federal assistance brings a local organization and its employees within the
jurisdiction of the federal bribery statute or even that all employees of local
organizations responsible for administering federal grant programs are public
officials within the meaning of section 201 (a).").89 Id. at 510 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90 Justice O'Connor's discussion of federalism expressed a position later
adopted by the Supreme Court in New Yorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),
and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), prohibiting Congress from
directly compelling the states to implement a federal policy. The Court reasoned
that Congress violates states' sovereignty when it acts directly on the states to
require them to engage in certain conduct.
9' The Court has not always defined "public official" so broadly for the purpose
of federal bribery statutes. In Krichman v. United States, 256 U.S. 363 (1921), the
Court overturned the federal bribery conviction of a baggage porter at a railroad
station who took a payment to expedite delivery of a trunk, even though the railroad
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who administer federal programs was not an affront to federalism because
the federal statute did not commandeer state or local officials to do its
bidding or otherwise usurp the state's authority to administer its policies,
as Justice O'Connor argued it did. Dixson permits the federal government
to punish those who misuse federal authority, even where the government
funnels that power through a local or non-governmental agency. The
federal government's interest remains the same in protecting against the
misuse of its sovereign power, and the criminal prohibition works no
greater invasion of the authority of the states than does the creation of
federally funded programs that use local officials to carry out federal
policy.
92
Justice O'Connor's reference to federalism was the first hint that some
members of the Court viewed federalism as a potential limit on the scope
of congressional authority to regulate through criminal statutes. Although
the Court decided Dixson ten years before Lopez, the question of whether
was under the control of the United States during World War I and therefore the
porter technically was an employee of the United States. The statute under which
the petitioner was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 91, required that the person prosecuted
be "an officer of the United States, or... a person acting for or on behalf of the
United States..."Id. at 365. The Court stated that "[n]ot every person performing
any service for the government, however humble, is embraced within the terms of
the statute. It includes those, not officers, who are performing duties of an official
character." Id. at 366. The Court found that the bribery, which was little more than
an otherwise unremarkable tip except for the nationalization of the rails during the
war, was beyond the intent of Congress because the statute would sweep up every
employee of the United States. Id. Krichman seems to be more a visceral reaction
to prosecutorial unfairness in seeking to criminalize an everyday event-a porter's
accepting a tip for carrying a bag-than a principled limitation on the scope of the
bribery provision. Cf. United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding conviction under § 201 of a prison cook because "the fact that he
violated rules of employment as a federal employee by accepting a thing of value
in exchange for smuggling in contraband and was therefore released from his
employment is sufficient factual support.., that he had responsibilities which he
did not keep").
92 In Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), the Court upheld the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, which restricted the states from disclosing driver's license
information. Although the statute directly regulated the states, the Court found that
the statute was a valid exercise under the Commerce Clause and did not violate
federalism because it did "not require the States in their sovereign capacity to
regulate their own citizens." Id. at 142. Criminal laws-such as § 20 I-enforced
by the federal government do not even involve the use of state and local officials
to implement a federal policy.
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federalism limits how Congress can regulate would come up again. Section
201, however, remains largely uncontroversial because bribery in the
exercise of any official authority subverts the governmental process, and
the federal interest in prosecuting such misconduct is significant.
The federal government is not limited to policing its own officials and
programs because the constitutional authority to regulate includes the
power to prescribe the use of interstate commerce and to spend federal
funds to further national interests. Congress enacted two statutes that apply
directly to the corruption of state and local officials who may fall outside
the prohibitions of § 201. The Hobbs Act prohibits extortion committed
"under color of official right," 93 and 18 U.S.C. § 666 prohibits bribery of
an officer of any organization or state or local government that receives
benefits in excess of $10,000 from the federal government during a one-
year period. 94 Both provisions reach corruption by those who are not
employees of the federal government and who do not have specific federal
responsibilities.95 These provisions are a significant extension of federal
authority beyond the protection of the functions of the sovereign that
permitted Congress to adopt § 201 as an exercise of its inherent authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The issue of federalism arises in
connection with ascertaining the scope of congressional authority to adopt
criminal statutes under these broader constitutional grants.
B. Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: 18 U.S.C. § 666
Section 666 is a broad federal anti-corruption statute aimed explicitly
at corruption at the state and local levels, including private organizations
that receive federal funds. Congress adopted the provision in 1984 out of
fear that a narrow interpretation of § 201 by the Supreme Court in Dixson
would effectively exempt virtually all non-federal officers from prosecution
under the anti-corruption statute. Congress expressed the concern that a
narrow interpretation of § 20 1's applicability to non-governmental officials
involved in the administration of federal programs and grants "gives rise to
a serious gap in the law, since even though title to the monies may have
" 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(b)(2) (2000).
94 d. § 666(b).
95 See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 195 (3d ed. 2000) ("Because the federal bribery and gratuities laws
apply only to federal officials, (or state and local officials receiving federal funds)
federal prosecutions of state and local corruption must be brought under some other
provision.").
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passed, the federal government clearly retains a strong interest in assuring
the integrity of such program funds. 96 It enacted the new provision to
augment "the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of
theft, fraud, and bribery involving federal monies that are disbursed to
private organizations or state and local governments pursuant to a federal
program. 97
While the Hobbs Act utilizes the broadest extent of the federal power
under the Commerce Clause, it has a more limited application than § 666
because it reaches only the public official receiving a payment-who
extorts under color of official right-and not the offeror. Congress adopted
§ 666 to broaden the scope of federal anti-corruption law by permitting the
prosecution of those who make corrupt payments, and by prohibiting other
forms of corruption such as embezzlement, theft, and fraud from govern-
mental organizations. Unlike § 201, which reaches only federal employees
and those who exercise federal authority, § 666 applies to any "agent of an
organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency
thereof .... ,,g Instead of limiting the statute to those occupying specific
official positions, § 666 conditions federal jurisdiction on the requirement
that the defendant be an agent of an "organization, government, or agency
[that] receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under
a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee,
insurance, or other form of Federal assistance."99 The statute also limits
federal jurisdiction by requiring proof that the bribe occur in connection
with transactions of the agency or governmental unit with a value of $5000
or more.'00 The corrupt payment itself need not have any specific
value--the statute only requires the offer and acceptance of "anything of
value"--but the subject matter of the corruption must meet the $5000
threshold for federal jurisdiction.
Section 666 is a logical extension of the federal interest in combating
corruption, an interest recognized by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma v.
96 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3510. The Senate Report specifically discussed-and sought to mitigate the effect
of--the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d
Cir. 1975), which read § 201 narrowly so that it did not cover state and local
officials. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 370. The Supreme Court's broad reading of
"public official" in Dixson largely undermined those narrow interpretations of §
201. See United States v. Dixson, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
97 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3182, 3510.
98 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1) (2000).
99 Id. § 666(b).
'00Id. § 666(a)(1)(B).
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United States Civil Service Commission. 10' The Court upheld the authority
of the federal government to impose conditions on states that accept federal
funds even though the condition was designed to reduce corruption in state
and local government, not the national government. The federal law at issue
prohibited any "officer or employee of any State or local agency whose
principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed
in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any
Federal agency... [from] tak[ing] any active part in political management
or in political campaigns. ' Although Congress did not have the constitu-
tional authority to impose the requirement directly on the states, it could
attach conditions to the states' receipt of federal benefits "by requiring
those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active
political partisanship."' 10 3 The federal government's interest in eliminating
corruption from all levels of government does not undermine the authority
of the states, but rather enhances the integrity of all governments. 1
04
01 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
102 Id. at 129 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 61). The provision at issue in Civil Service
Commission, though found to be constitutional, was subsequently amended. Today,
the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (2000), provides:
(a) A State or local officer or employee may not-
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering
with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for office;
(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, command, or advise
a State or local officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute anything
of value to a party, committee, organization, agency, or person for
political purposes; -or
(3) be a candidate for elective office.
(b) A State or local officer or employee retains the right to vote as he
chooses and to express his opinions on political subjects and candidates.
(c) Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply to--
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an individual
authorized by law to act as Governor;
(2) the mayor of a city;
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State or
municipality who is not classified under a State or municipal merit or
civil-service system; or
(4) an individual holding elective office.
103 Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 330 U.S. at 143.
'4 See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute--Corruption, the Spending Power,
and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 272 (1998)
[hereinafter Brown, Stealth Statute] ("It is possible, then, to read Oklahoma for the
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Since Lopez, however, courts have raised federalism questions about
the propriety of federal prosecution of state and local officials under § 666
to reach corruption in public offices and programs receiving federal
assistance. Some lower courts have criticized the breadth of § 666 because
it permits the federal government to prosecute state and local officials.
These courts perceive the statute as offending the principles of federalism
and have therefore imposed limits on its scope. These efforts, however,
ignore the clear language of the statute, which permits the prosecution of
corruption in state and local governments when the conduct is sufficiently
serious to warrant federal intervention. Federalism does not give courts
independent authority to rewrite statutes, and in the field of public
corruption the Anti-Corruption Legacy of the Constitution supports
congressional authority to adopt a broad statute targeting misconduct in the
administration of state and local government.
1. Salinas and Fischer:
The Broad Reading of Federal Authority under § 666
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 666 broadly on two occasions,
rejecting arguments that would have limited the authority of the federal
government to prosecute local corruption. In Salinas v. United States,°5 the
defendant was a deputy sheriff convicted of accepting bribes from a federal
prisoner, housed in the county jail, in exchange for preferential treatment
toward the prisoner. 10 6 The amount of federal funds received by the jail
easily exceeded the statutory $10,000 minimum, and the transactions that
were the subject of the bribe had a value greater than $5,000, so the
jurisdictional elements were undisputed. The Court rejected the defendant's
argument that, to prove jurisdiction under the statute, the government must
prove that the subject matter of the bribe involved the federal funds
provided to the agency or government: "The prohibition is not confined to
a business or transaction which affects federal funds. The word 'any,'
which prefaces the business or transaction clause, undercuts the attempt to
impose this narrowing construction.""' The Court recognized that Congress
adopted § 666 to expand federal anti-corruption law, so restricting the
proposition that Congress can utilize a state or local government's receipt of federal
funds as a hook to impose the 'broad policy objective' of honest pubic services
upon that government.").
"' Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
'06d. at 52.
'07 Id. at 57.
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statute to only bribes that directly affect the federal funds "would be
incongruous .. . .""' The Court also rejected the defendant's federalism
argument, based on Gregory v. Ashcroft, that the statute implicitly required
a nexus between the alleged misconduct and federal funds because it did
not plainly state the contrary." 9
Although the Court found the statute unambiguous, it further asserted
"there is no serious doubt about the constitutionality of § 666(a)(1)(B) as
applied to the facts of this case." ' 0 It is not clear why the Court saw a need
to address further the constitutionality of the provision, especially if there
was "no serious doubt" on an issue that was not relevant to the statutory
analysis and outside the question presented by the defendant. Despite its
holding that the government need not show a connection between the bribe
and the federal funds, the Court referred obliquely to federalism, stating
that "[w]hatever might be said about § 666(a)(1)(B)'s application in other
cases, the application of § 666(a)(1)(B) to Salinas did not extend federal
power beyond its proper bounds......
The constitutionality of § 666 under federalism is a question of
congressional authority to regulate, not the propriety of an application of
a statute in a particular prosecution. Salinas' off-hand reference to the
constitutionality of the statute "as applied" misstated the proper constitu-
tional analysis by giving the impression that federalism might require
additional proof of some relationship between the federal interest and a
defendant's conduct beyond the elements contained in the statute. 12 The
majority in Salinas may have been trying to assuage fears that § 666 created
a crime wholly outside the federal interest, but the Court's vague
invocation of federalism had the effect of encouraging lower courts to
consider arguments that the Constitution requires an extra-statutory limit
on the application of the statute.
The Court's second decision construing § 666 was Fischer v. United
States,"3 which broadly read the term "benefits" in determining whether an
organization or agency meets the $10,000 federal benefits element. At trial,
the defendant was convicted of violating § 666 for defrauding a hospital
108 Id. at 58.
'.. Id. at 60.
"01 d. (emphasis added).
...Id. at 61.
112 Cf United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The
Court nonetheless obliquely suggested [in Salinas] that there might be obstacles to
applying § 666 to different facts. .. ").
113 Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
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authority that received funds under the Medicare program and for paying
a kickback to an officer of an organization receiving federal funds." 4 Both
the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
Whether a government payment constitutes a "benefit" under § 666, the
Supreme Court held, depends on an examination of the program's "nature
and purposes."'1 5 The Court rejected the defendant's argument that
Medicare funds are only a reimbursement to the hospital for services
provided to the ultimate beneficiaries, finding instead that the funds "are
made not simply to reimburse for treatment of qualifying patients but to
assist the hospital in making available and maintaining a certain level and
quality of medical care, all in the interest of both the hospital and the
greater community."' 16
Although Fischer construed the statutory term broadly, the Court noted
that the receipt of funds from the federal government would not automati-
cally constitute a "benefit" because that "would turn almost every act of
fraud or bribery into a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal
balance."" 7 The Court did not explain what it meant by the "proper federal
balance," but like Salinas, the opinion may have sought to assuage any
apprehension that the statute would permit the federal government to
prosecute crimes for which there was no clear federal interest." 8 The Court
never explained what the federalism limits were for offenses involving
corruption in programs receiving federal funds. Unlike § 201, which only
reaches federal officials and those actually exercising federal authority,
§ 666 applies to all public officials and private persons working for
organizations or programs that receive substantial federal funding. The
1i4 Id. at 670. The charges related to a $1.2 million loan from the West Volusia
Hospital Authority-which received between $10 and $15 million in Medicare
funds--to defendant's company, and a $10,000 payment from the loan proceeds
to the Hospital Authority's chief financial officer. Id.
..5 Id. at 671.
116 Id. at 679-80.
"' Id. at 681.
118 See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The
Salinas Court merely observed in passing that, even if a federal interest were
required, such an interest clearly existed.... Similarly, the Fischer Court construed
a term in § 666 broadly, simply musing that federalism principles might somehow
limit the statute's sweep. As either a statutory or constitutional matter, then, the
Court might be seen as harboring inchoate qualms about whether, for § 666 to
apply, there might be some need for a direct interest in the funds involved in the
prohibited conduct... ." (emphasis added)).
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statute does not condition federal jurisdiction on the source of authority or
on a direct connection between the office and the federal funds.
Federal anti-corruption law reaches beyond those directly employed by
state and local governments, so there is a legitimate concern that not every
act in the private sector that may be corrupt should be prosecuted under
§ 666 if a transfer of federal funds to the organization could be found.
Fischer described the animating principle behind § 666 as protecting from
corruption the "integrity" of programs that receive federal funds--not just
protecting the funds themselves." 9 Section 666 permits the federal
government to act against both public and private corruption to the extent
that official authority or a substantial governmental policy is involved in
the program or organization; this involvement may be evidenced by the
receipt of a substantial amount of federal funds. The "proper federal
balance" includes protecting citizens from corruption by those purportedly
acting in the public interest, regardless of the states' authority to prosecute
such offenses.
2. Creating an Extra-Statutory Limit on Prosecutions under § 666
Despite the broad readings of § 666 in Salinas and Fischer, some lower
courts focused on the vague references to federalism in the Supreme
Court's opinions as a suggestion that they have the authority to impose a
limit on the statute to protect its constitutionality. Although the provision
does not require that the corrupt acts directly affect the receipt or adminis-
tration of federal money, some courts adopted a limited reading of the
statute, requiring the government to establish some federal nexus-albeit
something short of the direct effect on the funds that Salinas re-
jected-between the corruption and the federal role in the program or
organization, in order to avoid what they perceived to be potential
constitutional problems with the statute.
In United States v. Zwick121 the Third Circuit held that the prosecution
must prove a federal interest in the defendant's conduct, but the extent of
19 See Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681 ("The Government has a legitimate and
significant interest in prohibiting financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpe-
trated upon Medicare providers. Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity.");
see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 370 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3511 (The purpose of § 666 is "to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money
distributed through federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by
bribery.").
20 United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 1999).
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that relationship was unclear because "we surmise that a highly attenuated
implication of a federal interest will suffice for purposes of § 666.,,12 The
defendant was a member of a Pennsylvania township's Board of Commis-
sioners who solicited small-scale bribes from local businesses.1 22 The
government introduced proof that the township received federal funds for
emergency snow removal and a stream erosion project, which the court
found insufficient for a federal prosecution because the funds "bear no
obvious connection to Zwick's offense conduct, which involved sewer
access, use permits and landscaping performance bonds."'
' 23
The Second Circuit adopted a similar interpretation of § 666 in United
States v. Santopietro, 124 holding that the government must demonstrate "at
least some connection between the bribe and a risk to the integrity of the
federal ly] funded program....,,125 The court noted that its earlier position
121 Id. at 687.
122 Id. at 676-77.
121 Id. at 688. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for a new
trial, in part because the district court did not require the government to present
proof of the relation between the federal funds and the defendant's conduct, the
new element of the offense created by the circuit court's holding. Id.
The vague connection requirement imposed by Zwick requires the fact-finder
to trace the funds from a federal program to the organization involved in the
misconduct, and to determine whether the funds were sufficiently related to the
alleged corruption to permit the prosecution to proceed. These facts may not be
apparent until after trial. In United States v. Wright, 206 F. Supp. 2d 609 (D. Del.
2002), the district court painstakingly analyzed the government's evidence and
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that "[w]hile the federal government
gives funds to [Delaware Department of Transportation] projects, as it likely gives
to all the Departments of Transportation of all states, that does not in and of itself
create a federal interest in briberies that are unrelated to the projects that it funds."
Id. at 625. Tracing the federal funds through various state and local offices is
exactly the opposite of what § 666 requires; Salinas rejected the argument that the
government must show where the funds went or their relation to the corruption.
Yet, the vague connection requirement imposed by Zwick and other decisions has
the same effect, because trial courts will have to look to the flow of funds to find
the connection. The government may have to guess at how much evidence will be
necessary to meet the federal connection condition--the circuit courts have
deliberately left this question unanswered to avoid the Supreme Court's rejection
of a direct nexus requirement for a conviction--and likely will err on the side of
overproducing information to avoid losing a conviction on a ground unrelated to
the corruption at issue.
124 United States v. Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
I25 d. at 93.
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requiring proof that the corruption affected the federal funds was no longer
viable after Salinas, "but nothing in Salinas disturbs" its requirement that
the government prove "some connection" to the federal funds, despite the
fact that the statute contains no such element.
1 26
In United States v. McCormack,'27 a district court dismissed the indict-
ment of a police officer for accepting a $4000 bribe, finding that § 666
must be limited to conduct that bears some relationship to the federal
expenditure. '28 The district court found that federalism limited the authority
1
26 Id. The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d
Cir. 1994), had required the government to prove that the corruption "in some way
... touch upon federal funds." Id. at 493. In United States v. Kranovich, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Nev. 2003), the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada relied on the Second and Third Circuit decisions in holding that "[w]hile
there is no definitive answer to this question, we are persuaded that proof of a link
between the federal funds and the theft or bribe is necessary" for a § 666 charge.
Id. at 1115.
The Fifth Circuit has struggled over the issue of how closely related the
corruption must be to the federal funding. In United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d
404 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit overturned a conviction under § 666 because
the defendant was not an agent of the entity that received the federal funds, and
therefore his "actions did not and could not have threatened the integrity of federal
funds or programs." Id. at 413. The Fifth Circuit noted that its requirement that the
defendant be an agent of the particular organization receiving the federal funds was
"in close parallel" with the requirement "that the recipient organization must be
affected by the fraud." Id. at 413 n. 14. Phillips did not impose a federal nexus
requirement, similar to Zwick and Santopietro, however, and a later Fifth Circuit
opinion recognized that the relationship between the federal funds and the program
in which the corruption occurred need not be close. See United States v. Reyes, 239
F.3d 722, 735 (5th Cir. 2001) ("We are not convinced that Salinas wrought a
change upon our earlier precedents" rejecting a nexus requirement.). In United
States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002), a panel of Fifth Circuit judges
splintered over the constitutionality of § 666 in a case involving a former member
of the Dallas City Council, with each judge issuing a separate opinion. Two judges
decided to uphold the conviction for completely different reasons. Judge Smith
argued that the application of the statute was unconstitutional as applied because
there was no federal interest affected by the defendant's corrupt conduct. See id.
at 372 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot be necessary and proper to executing the
spending power for the government to prosecute local crimes that have no
relationship whatsoever to federal funds and programs.").
127 United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1998).
121ld. at 189.
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of the federal government to prosecute a local official for a violation
already covered by state criminal law. 129 Relying on Lopez, it held that
"whatever other applications of § 666 may be constitutional, this one is
not."' 30 The district court in McCormack was troubled by the application
of a federal statute to what the court viewed as a matter of petty corruption,
noting at one point that under a broad interpretation of the statute, "[T]he
law could make it a federal crime to offer $20 to a local traffic cop in order
to avoid a $50 ticket."'' It concluded that the prosecution was unconstitu-
tional because the case involved only local corruption unrelated to the
federal government's interests.
13 2
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits rejected arguments that, under
§ 666, the government must prove some relationship between the federal
funds that meet the statutory requirement and the defendant's corruption. 1
33
The Eighth Circuit held that "other than the threshold showing that the
agency in question received more than $10,000 in federal benefits in any
1
29 1d. at 185.
'30 Id. at 187.
" Id. at 183 (citing United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D. Ind.
1996)).
1 3
1 Id. at 189 ("Clearly the conduct at issue here-bribing a local police officer
to prevent further investigation and/or prosecution for state crimes-is not 'related
to a legitimate national problem' because it is not directed towards protecting the
integrity of federal funds given to the Malden police department or even to the
programs those funds were intended to support."). The district court was not
required to reach the constitutional issue, because it found that the $4000 bribe did
not meet § 666's requirement that the corrupt payment be in connection with
transactions involving a value of $5000 or more (the court reasoned that the bribe
affected conduct with only an intangible value, not a monetary value). See id. at
182-83. It is not clear why the district court addressed the constitutional question
after finding that the government had not charged a crime under § 666 because it
could not establish all the elements of the offense. The court did not even assert
that its constitutional analysis was an alternative holding, or that the constitutional
issue affected its analysis of the government's proof. Id. at 189.
Similarly to the McCormack court, the district court in United States v. Frega,
933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996), dismissed § 666 charges on the ground that
"the indictment does not allege that federal funds were corruptly administered,
were in danger of being corruptly administered, or even could have been corruptly
administered." Id. at 1543. In United States v. Kranovich, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(D. Nev. 2003), a district court adopted the nexus requirement but then held that
the government's proof at trial established that additional requirement.
'
33 See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
387 (2003); United States v. Dakota, 188 F.3d 663, amended, 197 F.3d 821 (6th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348 (7th Cir. 1998).
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one-year period, § 666 imposes no requirement that there be a connection
between the offense conduct and the federal funds., 134 Although the Sixth
Circuit rejected the nexus element, a panel of the court noted that "[w]ere
we writing on a clean slate, I, like the dissent, might well agree that proper
application of 18 U.S.C. § 666 requires a minimal nexus between the
alleged criminal activity and the federal funding received pursuant to the
statute." '135
Decisions requiring the government to prove this funding-corruption
nexus relied on assertions in Salinas and Fischer. Although the Court
construed § 666 broadly in those cases, it stated that it had avoided even
more expansive readings of the statute that, while plausible, might upset the
"proper" federal role in the criminal law. 36 The lower courts took these
declarations of judicial fealty to a limited federal authority as a signal that
they could impose an extra-statutory limit on the statute to prevent what
they perceived to be an unwarranted extension of federal power.'37
14 Sabri, 326 F.3d at 945.
135 United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468,489 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 991 (2002). The dissent argued, "Given Fischer, it is no longer tenable to hold
to the proposition that no connection whatsoever need exist between the federally
punished criminal conduct and the federal interest in the programs supported by the
funds used to satisfy § 666(b)." Id. at 486-87 (Boggs, J., dissenting in part).
136 See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 681 (2000) (A broader
interpretation of benefit "would turn almost every act of fraud or bribery into a
federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance."); Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997) (The application of§ 666 to the defendant "did not extend
federal power beyond its proper bounds."); cf Cheryl Crumpton Herring,
Commentary, 18 US.C. § 666: Is It a Blank Check to Federal Authorities
Prosecuting State and Local Corruption?, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1317, 1327 (2001)
("Congress did not consider it necessary to extend the scope of section 666 to the
point where it makes a federal crime out of state and local corruption that has no
impact on federal funds.").
137 Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1540 ("[I]t would drastically change the balance of
power between federal and state governments by bringing conduct that had
previously been entirely in the realm of the states within the federal purview.");
United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 682-83 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The most literal
interpretation--that the statute lacks a federal connection requirement-is troubling
from an interpretive standpoint in that it broadens the range of activity criminalized
by the statute and alters the existing balance of federal and state powers by
encompassing acts already addressed under state law in which the federal
government may have little interest."); McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 186 ("While
this broad interpretation of the statute is entirely plausible.., there is no question
that it would result in a drastic change in the balance of power between federal and
state governments." (citations omitted)). The district court in McCormack asserted
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Interestingly, none of the courts imposing the federal funding connection
requirement found § 666 unconstitutional. Instead, they adopted an as-
applied approach that purported to rely on the federalism rationale
advanced in Lopez and Morrison to declare the prosecution unconstitu-
tional absent proof of the requisite connection to federal funding. The
lower courts never acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not use
federalism in those cases to rewrite the elements of the offenses at issue,
but instead it declared the entire provision unconstitutional as beyond the
power of Congress to adopt.
3. Does the Spending Power Limit the Scope of§ 666?
Justice Thomas' dissent in Fischer asserted that "Section 666 was
adopted pursuant to Congress's spending power, art. I, § 8, cl. L."38 This
assertion reiterated the position of a number of federal courts, which view
§ 666 as grounded in the spending power, under which Congress has the
authority to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States ... 3 Unlike the Commerce Clause, which authorizes
Congress to regulate only "commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States,""'4 the Spending Clause permits Congress to expend funds
to promote the "general Welfare of the United States." 14' In United States
v. Butler,142 the Court held that "the power of Congress to authorize
that the prosecution was unconstitutional because it "went too far in extending
federal power," id. at 185, but it never explained how it ascertained that the
prosecution traversed the line between the federal and state interests. Although the
opinion refers to the federalism limitations, it never analyzes how the principle of
federalism empowers a court to decide that a case is not a permissible exercise of
the national government's power; the opinion only suggests that when a § 666
prosecution exceeds federal authority, the court intuits that the government should
not have brought the case. In Frega, the district court's assertion that a broad
application of § 666 would "drastically change" the federal-state balance is simply
untrue if one considers the application of the Hobbs Act and Mail Fraud statutes
to public corruption. Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1540. Even if one rejects the
application of those statutes to corruption by lower-level officials, § 666 in no way
displaces the authority of the states to pursue corruption charges.
"I Fischer, 529 U.S. at 689 n.3.
'39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
'40 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
141 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
142 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."'143 While
Congress may not regulate in every field, it may expend federal money to
achieve a result that it might not otherwise be able to accomplish through
direct legislative activity.'
4
Even that broad power, however, is limited because it does not permit
Congress to impose any condition it wishes upon those who accept federal
funds. South Dakota v. Dole'45 is the principal case considering the
constitutionality of conditions imposed on states receiving federal funds.
The case involved a state's challenge to a condition attached to federal
highway funding, which required recipient states to adopt legislation
establishing twenty-one as the minimum age to consume alcohol. 46 The
Supreme Court adopted a four-part test for reviewing conditions attached
to federal disbursements: (1) "the exercise of the spending power must be
in pursuit of 'the general welfare"'; (2) the conditions must be unambigu-
ous; (3) conditions must be related "to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs"; and (4) "other constitutional provisions may
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.' 4 7 In
upholding the condition at issue, the Court noted that constitutional
authority under the Spending Clause is not restricted to those areas in
which Congress can regulate directly and that the Tenth Amendment does
not "limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.' 48
143 Id. at 66.
' See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
89, 93 (2001) ("[N]o limits on the scope of the spending power can be reasonably
inferred from the text of the Constitution."); see also Thomas R. McCoy & Barry
Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV.
85, 102 ("[T]he delegated power to spend money for the general welfare is a power
separate from and in addition to all of Congress's specific delegated legislative or
regulatory powers.").
"' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
14 Id.
14' Id. at 207-08.
148 Id. at 210. The Court also stated, "[O]bjectives not thought to be within
Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' . . . may nevertheless be attained through
the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds." Id. at
207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). This broad reading
of the Spending Clause has been criticized as "unprecedented," and some suggest
that it "invited the complete abrogation of any limits on the delegated powers of
Congress." McCoy & Friedman, supra note 144, at 10 1-02.
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The federal connection requirement imposed by lower courts is not
rooted in the language of § 666, which requires only proof that the program
or organization received the requisite federal funding in the relevant period,
without touching on how the defendant's conduct affected the use of those
funds. Instead, the lower courts looked to the constitutional basis for the
congressional enactment of the provision as a separate source of judicial
authority to limit the reach of the statute. Lower courts assert that § 666 is
an exercise of the spending power, and therefore that the statute can apply
only to misconduct related to the expenditure of federal funds, in order to
be a proper exercise of congressional authority. This is not an analysis of
the limits of the Commerce Clause on congressional authority, as the
Supreme Court undertook in Lopez and Morrison. Lower courts import a
notion of federalism as a separate limit on the spending power. This view
empowers courts to create a new element for proving a violation of § 666,
preserving what the courts presume to be the requisite distinction between
"what is truly national and what is truly local."' 149
When evaluating § 666, lower courts seized on the third Dole
requirement, that the condition be related to a federal interest, as the basis
for limiting the scope of the statute. In McCormack, the district court stated
that the germaneness requirement "provides the most plausible attack on §
666(a)" and that requiring proof of a connection between federal funding
and the bribery "is consistent with the limits the Supreme Court has placed
on the spending power."' 5° The Third Circuit in Zwick held that "absent
evidence of any federal interest, [§ 666] would appear to be an unconstitu-
tional exercise of power under the Spending Clause."'' The Fifth Circuit
in Phillips similarly held that the prosecution "advances no federal interest
in safeguarding a particular federal program" as required by the Spending
Clause if there is no connection between the bribe and federal funding.'52
'" United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605-08 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
' 0 United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176,188-89 (D. Mass. 1998).
... United States v. Zwick, 199 F.2d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999).
.5, United-States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404,414 (5th Cir. 2000). In United States
v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002), Judge Weiner argued that § 666 was
reasonably related to the federal interest, thereby meeting the third factor of the
test, because "Congress could have believed, quite legitimately, that preventing
federal funds from passing through state and local legislative bodies whose
members are corrupt, and to do so with the deterrent of criminalizing the legisla-
tors' corruption, even with respect to purely state or local issues, was necessary and
proper to the federal spending power." Id. at 336-37. The United States District
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These courts transformed South Dakota v. Dole into a requirement that
the government prove an affirmative connection between the criminal act
and the federal funding; otherwise the prosecution could be blocked
because it was unconstitutional as applied.'53 This new element of the
offense bears no relation to the language of § 666, resting instead on the
supposed limits of the spending power as a limited grant of legislative
authority that imports the notion of a federal connection between the funds
and the criminal prosecution.'54
It seems self-evident that Congress adopted § 666 pursuant to the
spending power because the statutory language ties federal jurisdiction to
the transfer of more than $10,000 of federal funds in a twelve-month period
to the local program or organization in which the corruption occurred.'
Court for the District of Connecticut rejected a facial challenge to § 666 because
the Second Circuit's nexus requirement saved the statute from an constitutional
infirmity. United States v. Ganim, 225 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D. Conn. 2002).
' Even Judge Weiner's opinion upholding the constitutionality of a § 666
conviction under the Spending Clause in Lipscomb, considered only the as-applied
challenge by an elected legislator in a city that received a significant amount of
federal funds. See Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 303. Reviewing the constitutionality of
a prosecution as applied in a particular case to detennine whether there is a
sufficient federal interest means a court will engage in the same type of scrutiny of
the government's evidence as it would under the vague connection requirement
recognized by some courts.
'4 Interestingly, no court has found a condition attached to spending
unconstitutional in any other context because it did not have the necessary relation
to a federal interest. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1,
62 (1994) ("[I]t remains true (so far) that the Supreme Court never actually has
held any spending condition unconstitutional for lack of germaneness-whether to
the process of spending, or to the purpose of a particular funding program, or to
any enumerated end."); Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to
Circumvent City ofBoerne v. Flores: Why the Court ShouldRequire Constitutional
Consistency in Its Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469,
469 (2000) ("No federal appropriations program has been invalidated by the
Supreme Court on federalism-based grounds since 1936.").
"' A plausible argument can be made that the statute is an exercise of the
commerce power and not an enactment solely under the Spending Clause. The
statutory requirement of a transfer of $10,000 of federal funds to a governmental
unit or private agency means that the organization for which the defendant is an
agent or employee is likely to have a significant effect on interstate commerce
under the third Lopez prong. Moreover, the requirement that the transactions
involved in the corruption have a value of at least $5000 ensures that there is more
than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. These two elements demonstrate
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Unlike the condition attached to the highway funding in South Dakota v.
Dole, however, § 666 is a criminal prohibition that does not operate directly
on the states. Courts have not analyzed the scope of congressional power
to adopt a criminal law prohibiting bribery under the Spending Clause.
The first two cases to mention the constitutional basis for the statute
were two cursory district court decisions-United States v. Bigler'5 6 and
United States v. Cantor,' issued three days apart---that asserted in dicta
that Congress adopted § 666 under its spending power.'58 Justice Thomas
gave his imprimatur to this constitutional analysis in his dissent in Fischer,
but his opinion does little more than assert the proposition without any
analysis, in much the same way as every other opinion on the subject.
Based only on such meager references to the Spending Clause, courts
then assume that § 666 must be a condition attached to the disbursement of
federal funds, and therefore subject to the constitutional conditions analysis
of South Dakota v. Dole. That assumption, however, is incorrect because
the Spending Clause does not, standing alone, confer on Congress the
authority to enact laws. Congress may spend money for the "general
welfare," but that has never been a source of authority to regulate directly.
The Court reviewed the propriety of the conditions attached to the spending
in South Dakota v. Dole and, earlier, in Oklahoma v. United States Civil
that both the state or local organization or program and the subject matter of the
misconduct have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and taken together
they show that the exercise of authority easily meets the Commerce Clause
standard set forth in Lopez. No court has considered whether § 666 may be an
exercise of the commerce power. Every judicial opinion that touches the subject
assumes, without any real analysis, that the statute is an exercise of the spending
power. In addition, the government does not appear to have argued that the statute
is valid under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d
1145, 1154 n. 10 (D. Minn. 2002) ("The government has not argued that Congress
enacted § 666 pursuant to the exercise of legislative power under the Commerce
Clause; therefore, this Court will not consider the issue."), rev'd, 326 F.3d 937 (8th
Cir. 2003).
156 United States v. Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
' United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
8 In Bigler, a brief opinion rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that § 666 was unconstitutional, the Court referred to the
Spending Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, as providing a sufficient basis for its enactment. Bigler,
907 F. Supp. at 402. In Cantor, the district court noted simply that "[tihe parties
agree that Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 pursuant to its spending power."
Cantor, 897 F. Supp. at 113.
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Service Commission, on the assumption that Congress did not have the
authority to impose the conditions directly on the states; indeed, such direct
regulation could raise serious federalism concerns. A condition attached to
an offer of federal funds is similar to a contract; it is enforceable against the
states unless the financial inducement is "so coercive as to pass the point
at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."" 59 Congress operates directly
on the states under the spending power by attaching the condition to the
offer of funds, inducing them to act by offering a benefit that-absent
unconstitutional compulsion--they are free to reject. 60 As the Court noted
in South Dakota v. Dole, a condition is not unconstitutional "simply by
reason of its success in achieving the congressional objective." 6 '
Congress may incorporate a conditional grant of funds in a law enacted
through the same procedures as any other provision adopted under an
enumerated power, but that does not give the condition the force of law
absent the states' consent by accepting federal funds and adopting their
own conforming laws. Professor Engdahl argues, "What makes such
conditions obligatory is that essence as contract, wholly apart from the
circumstance that they happen to be spelled out in a statute or an agency
rule ... they have no force as 'law'; their only force is contractual."' 62
Unlike the prohibition on commandeering state authority to accomplish a
federal goal that the Court articulated in New York v. United States163 and
Printz v. United States,' 6 the Spending Clause essentially allows Congress
' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
160 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) ("Although we have been
careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation
... we have regularly applied the contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope
of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable for money damages.").
161 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
162 Engdahl, supra note 154, at 71.
163 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Court held that the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act came within congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, but that the statute was unconstitutional because "the
provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established
by the Constitution." Id. at 177.
"6 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The Court invalidated the
Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act's requirement that state and local officials
undertake background checks on prospective handgun purchasers because it
violated the anti-comandeering principle of New York v. United States. The Court
emphasized that the residual state sovereignty protected by federalism meant that
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to enlist the states by offering them a benefit that carries with it a concomi-
tant obligation to fulfill the demands of the federal government.1
65
Section 666 is not a condition imposed on the states to induce them to
cooperate with the national government. 66 Unlike other conditions that
Congress attaches to federal funding, 167 § 666 applies to any program or
organization--public or private-that receives federal funds without
requiring any further conduct on the part of the recipient. The criminal
prohibition exists apart from the payment of the funds, and the jurisdic-
tional requirement that the program receive a certain amount of federal
money in a limited period permits the prosecution in federal court but does
not operate as a condition on the operation of the program or affect the
future receipt of federal funds. If § 666 is a condition, then it is like no
other in the law of contracts because it attaches regardless of the recipient's
agreement to it, and the term has no effect on the performance of the
parties--neither the federal government nor the program or organization
receiving the funds-in fulfilling the purported agreement.
68
Section 666 operates directly on individuals engaged in corruption who
were acting on behalf of a program or organization that receives federal
"[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural
protections of liberty." Id. at 921.
165 See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (The requirement that a state comply with a condition attached to federal
funding "is comparable to the ordinary quid pro quo that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly approved; the State is offered federal funds for some activities, but, in
return, it is required to meet certain federal requirements in carrying out those
activities.").
166 See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2003) ("While
traditional Spending Clause legislation is in the 'nature' of a contract, it is not a
contract .... Instead, 'contract' is used only metaphorically to illuminate and
explain certain aspects of the relationship formed between the federal government
and the recipient of the federal funds. We find this metaphor useful to our
discussion here, and we note that § 666 has none of the hallmarks of a contractual
relationship which characterizes typical Spending Clause legislation." (citation
omitted)).
167 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2003)
(prohibiting "any program or activity" receiving federal funds from discriminating
against a qualified person with a disability).
168 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
("The legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate under the spending power thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
'contract.' ").
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funds.'69 The law does not require that the states, or any of their depart-
ments or agencies, do anything as a condition for receiving the funds or
suffer any penalty because an agent of the program or organization violated
§ 666. Instead, the criminal statute reaches individual conduct that involves
a misuse of public authority, and it neither makes the proper exercise of
state authority a crime under federal law nor permits federal prosecution of
the organization because of the conduct of one of its agents. Section 666
prohibits bribery, fraud, and misuse of property-conduct that undermines
governmental authority and that would also be subject to prosecution by the
states, regardless of the source of funding.
70
169 See Sabri, 326 F.3d at 946 ("Unlike typical Spending Clause enactments, §
666 imposes no affirmative obligation on the recipient of federal funds .... Nor
does § 666 proscribe conduct of the recipient of the federal funds." (citations
omitted)); see also United States v. Ferrara, 990 F. Supp. 146, 151 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) ("Simply stated, the focus is on the individuals who control the dollars, not
the dollars themselves.").
170 In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127
(1947), the Court upheld under the spending power the application to the state of
the Hatch Political Activity Act, which prohibits individuals holding governmental
appointments from engaging in certain types of political activity. See id. at 143; 5
U.S.C. § 1502 (2000). The statute gives the federal government enforcement
powers directly against state programs receiving federal funds whose officials
violated the Hatch Act, including withholding funds or an order directing the
removal of the official who violated the restrictions on political activity while
holding state office. See id. § 1506. Civil Service Commission upheld the
predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 61, which is reprinted in full in the case and
describes removal from office. See Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 330 U.S. at 129 n.1, 143.
The Court held that "[w]hile the United States is not concerned with and has no
power to regulate local political activities as such of state officials, it does have
power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be dis-
bursed." Id. at 143. The Court declined to find a violation of state sovereignty when
the federal government sought to force Oklahoma to remove one of its Highway
Commission officers, even though the officer's conduct did not violate any state
law and there was no allegation of corruption in his political activities. Id. If one
accepts that Court's assertion that a federal order to remove a state officer because
of political activities not otherwise forbidden by state law-activities certainly
protected by the First Amendment-then it is hard to see how § 666 could be a
violation of state sovereignty. Unlike the Hatch Act, which seeks to improve public
service by requiring appointed government officials to abstain from political
activity, § 666 punishes conduct that has long been considered criminal and an
abuse of power. Section 666 does not work directly on the states, as the Hatch Act
does, and there is no likelihood that a state would permit an official convicted of
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It is misguided to assert that § 666 is a condition attached to federal
spending that somehow regulates the states as states. The statute does not
affect permissible exercises of state power, but instead misappropriation of
resources or corruption in the administration of programs receiving federal
funds."' Unlike other types of conditions attached to federal funds, § 666
neither punishes a state or its departments because of a violation, nor
precludes future disbursements of federal money to programs affected by
corruption convictions. Moreover, the statute reaches both public and
bribery, embezzlement, or fraud to remain in office. The federalism argument
would appear to be much stronger against the application of the Hatch Act to the
states through the spending power than against a criminal provision, also enacted
pursuant to the spending power, which punishes an individual officeholder for
clearly improper conduct. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 371 (1980)
("[R]egulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause of individuals is quite
different from legislation which directly regulates the internal functions of states.").
Yet, in Civil Service Commission, the Court upheld the federal invasion of a state's
prerogative to appoint its own officials because, "even though the action taken by
Congress does have effect upon certain activities within the state, it has never been
thought that such effect made the federal act invalid." Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 330
U.S. at 143.
171 In Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, the Court stated that "legislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." The
issue in Pennhurst was whether a "bill of rights" for patients under the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act provided to mentally-impaired
patients substantive rights that could be enforced against the states. Id. at 2. The
Court held that Congress had not unambiguously imposed the bill of rights as a
condition of state acceptance of federal funds, so the Court could not determine
whether Congress imposed an obligation on the states "or whether it spoke merely
in precatory terms." Id. at 18. The Court's language appears to limit permissible
legislation under the Spending Clause to only conditions, but congressional
authority under the constitutional grant includes the adoption of legislation related
to federal spending that is not in the form of a condition, such as creating a federal
regulatory structure or making it a criminal offense to accept a bribe if one is a
federal "official." Similarly, in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), the Court
discussed the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages against a
municipality under a statute adopted pursuant to the Spending Clause; the Court
emphasized that the contract-law nature of the legislation precluded the imposition
of such damages. The Court stated that the contract-law analogy "applies, we think,
in determining the scope of damages remedies." See id. at 187. Neither Pennhurst
nor Barnes expressly limited the Spending Clause to conditional grants, but instead
focused on that issue because it was the source of the private right of action under
the applicable statutes.
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private organizations receiving federal funds, as opposed to the conditional
federal spending upheld in South Dakota v. Dole or the anti-commandeer-
ing rule applied New York and Printz to restrain the assertion of federal
authority over the states. In those cases, the statutes at issue operated
directly on the states as states, while § 666 is a criminal statute that subjects
individual defendants to prosecution.
Unlike conditional spending, § 666 operates after the fact to protect the
integrity of governmental power by punishing those who offer and accept
bribes, engage in fraudulent activity, or embezzle from their programs or
organizations.'72 Section 666 punishes the miscreant agent, not the faithful
government servant. Therefore, it does not usurp state authority to further
a federal policy or regulate another sovereign in any way. Section 666 is
not a condition attached to federal funding, but rather incorporates the
distribution of federal money as the jurisdictional basis for a criminal
prosecution to vindicate the national government's interest in protecting
against corruption. Therefore, the four requirements of South Dakota v.
Dole for determining the propriety of federal conditions imposed on the
states as part of a grant of funds simply do not provide a basis to read into
§ 666 a federal connection requirement.'73
172 See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 678 (2000) ("This language
indicates that Congress viewed many federal assistance programs as providing
benefits to participating organizations. Coupled with the broad substantive
prohibitions of subsection (a), the language of subsection (b) reveals Congress'
expansive, unambiguous intent to ensure the integrity of organizations participating
in federal assistance programs."); United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1326
(11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1078 (2002) (Fischer's "reference to ensuring
integrity, as well as the identification of plural federal assistance programs,
suggests a reading of § 666 as serving a Congresional meta-purpose: the creation
of an enforcement mechanism sufficient to assure that disbursements meeting the
§ 666(b) threshold are in fact applied in furtherance of the purposes for which they
are dispensed."); United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303,333 (5th Cir. 2002) ("A
corrupt state or city official who has real responsibility for, or often participates in,
the allocation of federal funds is a 'threat to the integrity' of those funds, even if
they are not actually or directly infected by his corruption." (quoting Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997))).
113 The test articulated in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), helps
determine whether a condition is constitutional or not, but it is not a method of
statutory interpretation. If a condition attached by Congress violates any of the four
parts of Dole, then the condition cannot be enforced. Id. at 207-08. In Pennhurst,
451 U.S. at 17, the Court held that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously." Id. at 17. The
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4. Congressional Authority to Adopt
§ 666 as an Encompassing Public Corruption Statute
If § 666 is not a condition appended to a bill that disburses or relates
to the distribution of federal funds, the question arises whether Congress
has the authority to adopt the statute under the Spending Clause. Although
§ 666 is not a form of conditional spending, it can still be an exercise of the
spending power in conjunction with the authority granted to Congress
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Constitution provides that
Congress has the authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. ,,1." While
it does not confer on Congress any greater authority than that contained in
the enumerated powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause does afford
Congress considerable flexibility in adopting statutes that appear to fall
beyond the express terms of congressional authority prescribed in the
Constitution. 175
Pennhurst requirementpermits courts to scrutinize whether in fact Congress sought
to impose a condition on a state receiving funds. If it did impose a condition then,
absent an improper exercise authority under South Dakota v. Dole, the condition
will be upheld because Congress is not limited under the Spending Clause in how
it may choose to spend federal funds to advance federal policies. Courts that rely
on the germaneness requirement to impose a limit on the scope of § 666 misuse the
Dole test by viewing it as a measure that permits courts to reformulate a congres-
sional enactment to ensure a relation to a federal interest in the particular
prosecution. The test for conditions does not apply to a criminal statute that is not
a condition attached to federal spending. Similarly, the clear statement requirement
of Pennhurst is inapplicable because Congress need not speak any more clearly
than it must in other criminal statutes regarding the scope of § 666; the plain
language of the statute controls its application, as the Court held in Salinas. See
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57-58. But see Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 321 ("Therefore,
although we may debate whether the § 666 peg fits the conditional-grant hole, I
shall test it under the four prongs of Dole.").
... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
'75 See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937,951 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[Section] 666
was designed to protect the integrity of the vast sums of federal monies disbursed
through federal programs."); Edgar, 304 F.3d at 1325 ("As a means of ensuring the
efficacy of federal appropriations to comprehensive federal assistance programs,
the anti-corruption enforcement mechanism strikes us as bearing a sufficient
relationship to Congress's spending power to dispel any doubt as to its constitution-
ality."); Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 324 ("Prosecuting Lipscomb under § 666 is
therefore constitutional if § 666 is 'necessary and proper' to Congress's spending
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Chief Justice Marshall's venerable opinion in M'Culloch v.
Maryland7 6 set forth the broad reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."' 77 Marshall viewed federal
criminal statutes as the prototypical example of the type of legislation that,
while outside the express powers granted to Congress, was a proper
exercise of the implied power conferred by the Necessary and Proper
Clause. He wrote, "The good sense of the public has pronounced, without
hesitation, that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may
power."). Professor Engdahl asserts that § 666 cannot be based on the spending
power because "Congress has no more power to punish theft from the beneficiaries
of its largesse than it has to punish theft from anyone else .... Money cannot
infect the recipient with the germ of generalized federal governing control, or an
infectious virus capable of spreading that disease to anyone who touches the
recipient or its property." Engdahl,. supra note 154, at 92. Picaresque language
aside, the conclusion misconstrues § 666 and congressional authority to adopt
criminal provisions. Section 666 punishes certain forms of corruption, and the
federal funding provides the basis for federal jurisdiction but does not make it a
crime simply to steal money. Moreover, Congress uses its authority under the
Commerce Clause to punish conduct related to theft, such as the interstate
transportation of stolen property. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) ("Whoever
transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing
the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined under
this title or imprisoned. . . ."). The classic state law offense of rustling cattle-a
staple of most Westems-can be a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2316 (2000)
("Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any livestock, knowing the
same to have been stolen, shall be freed under this title or imprisoned. . . ."). The
federal funds are not a "germ," but instead an acceptable limitation on federal
criminal jurisdiction to a limited range of cases that vindicate the national
government's interest in preventing and punishing corruption at any level of
government. Conditions imposed on the states under statutes adopted pursuant to
the spending power are laws under the Supremacy Clause: the key is whether
Congress validly adopted the spending provision, and not what effect the funds
have on a recipient. See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 860 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1045 ("The well-established principle that acts passed
under Congress's spending power are supreme law has not been abandoned in
recent [Supreme Court] decisions.").
176 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
'77Id. at 421.
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be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his
constitutional powers."'
7 8
Subsequent nineteenth-century decisions followed the analysis of
M'Culloch v. Maryland in upholding the authority of Congress to enact
criminal laws to punish violations related to exercises of an enumerated
power. In United States v. Fox,179 the Court upheld a federal criminal
statute punishing the obtaining of goods under false pretenses within three
months of filing a bankruptcy petition, stating that, taken together, the
Bankruptcy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause yielded "no doubt
of the competency of Congress to provide, by suitable penalties, for the
enforcement of all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of
powers with which it is intrusted."' ° In United States v. Hall,' the Court
upheld a statute making it a crime for the guardian of a child, aged sixteen
or under, to embezzle or fraudulently convert pension funds paid by the
United States to the child. Rejecting the argument that the statute was
beyond congressional power because the crime was an offense only under
state law, the Court relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to hold that
"[b]ecause the fund proceeds from the United States, and inasmuch as the
donation is a voluntary gift, the Congress may pass laws for its protection,
certainly until it passes into the hands of the beneficiary .... ,,i2
Section 666 is directly related to the Spending Clause, because it
depends on the expenditure of federal money as the trigger for the requisite
federal constitutional interest in -criminal enforcement. Congressional
authority under the spending power is not only limited to attaching
conditions to a disbursement of funds, such as the requirement upheld in
Dole, but also includes the authority to protect the federal interest
in preventing and prosecuting corruption when federal funds are present.1
8 3
171Id at 418. Chief Justice Marshall used the example of the postal power and
the crime of theft of mail, noting that "[i]t may be said, with some plausibility, that
the right to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is not indispensably
necessary to the establishment of a post-office and post-road." Id. at 417. He
rejected the "baneful influence of this narrow construction on all the operations of
the government, and the absolute impracticability of maintaining it .... Id. at 417-
18.
' United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1877).80 Id. at 672.
18l United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
I82 d. at 357-58.
183 See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937,951 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Congress has
made a determination that the most effective way to protect the integrity of federal
funds is to police the integrity of the agencies administering those fuands."); United
States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1327 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("It is reasonable for
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The Anti-Corruption Legacy of the Constitution becomes relevant because
the interest of the national government includes ensuring that corruption
does not affect the exercise of public authority in state and local govern-
ments. This strong federal interest permits Congress to enact § 666 as an
appropriate means to the constitutional end of spending federal money.'
84
Unlike a condition designed to co-opt the states into advancing a
federal policy they might otherwise not pursue, § 666 does not achieve an
objective that could not be obtained under other enumerated powers.
Congress clearly could make bribery and embezzlement involving state and
local officials a federal crime under the Commerce Clause, as it did in the
Hobbs Act."85 Corruption is largely an economic offense; it is not a crime
of violence or one with only an attenuated commercial effect. Misuse of
governmental authority enriches both officeholders and those offering
bribes because it is likely to result in a misallocation of governmental
resources. Rather than act under its commerce power, however, Congress
chose a more limited means to address bribery involving lower-level
officials that is far short of what it could have achieved.
86
Those arguing that § 666 implicitly requires a connection between the
federal funds and the prosecuted corruption contend that the statute
Congress to conclude that any corruption of such recipient organizations,
regardless of whether the corruption involves the misappropriation of specifically
federal funds, endangers the comprehensive programs in which the organizations
participate, and thus the effective exercise of the Congressional spending power as
well.").
'" See Sabri, 326 F.3d at 949 ("Applying the M'Culloch framework, we
conclude that § 666 is a law necessary and proper to the execution of Congress's
spending power."). But see Engdahl, supra note 154, at 93 ("Hamilton's spending
power view does not posit Congress as competent to do anything toward
extraneous (i.e., nonenumerated) ends, except spend.").
185 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 371 (1980) ("[R]egulation by
Congress under the Commerce Clause of individuals is quite different from
legislation which directly regulates the internal functions of states.") (citation
omitted); cf infra note 208 (discussing how § 666 could be an exercise of the
commerce power).
186 In addition to the statutory elements that the government must prove for
federal jurisdiction, Congress explicitly excluded "bona fide salary, wages, fees,
or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of
business" from providing the basis for prosecution under the statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(c) (2000). These transactions certainly affect commerce, and could provide
a constitutionally permissible avenue for federal jurisdiction, but Congress limited
the scope of the provision to the types of corrupt transactions that affect the
integrity of governmental programs and policies on a larger scale.
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represents an unprecedented extension of federal authority into the
domain of the state and local government, reaching crimes in which there
is no federal interest. If one accepts that certain crimes should not be
subject to federal prosecution, then an external limit located in the
Constitution can be imposed. This analysis, however, ignores the fact that
Congress imposed jurisdictional limits on cases brought under § 666, and
these limits belie the assertion that the statute exceeds the proper scope of
federal interests.
Congress adopted three separate jurisdictional requirements in § 666,
which operate to limit federal involvement in prosecuting state and local
corruption. First, the government must demonstrate that the program or
organization received $10,000 in federal funds within a twelve-month
period. 87 Courts taking a critical view of § 666 assert that this element is
almost trivial, because every state and local government of any size
receives at least that amount. That Congress chose a low threshold to
trigger federal jurisdiction does not mean the element is meaningless,'88 and
the important federal interest in combating corruption supports Congress'
decision to reach a broad array of improprieties by governmental officials.
The $10,000 requirement represents a permissible judgment by Congress
that corruption in all but the smallest governmental units and local
programs-where corruption is unlikely to occur due to the limited funding
and small scale of the operation-should be subject to federal prosecu-
tion. '89
187 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
'8 See United States v. Jackson, 313 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing
§ 666 conviction because "[o]ur extensive review of the record reveals a dearth of
evidence to support the essential element that the City received more than $10,000
per year in federal funds.").
189 In Sabri, 326 F.3d at 951, the court held:
The maladministration of funds in one part of an agency can affect the
allocation of funds, whether federal or local in origin, throughout an entire
agency. Thus, to suggest that corruption involving a discrete department or
section of an agency that does not itself receive federal funds or administer
a federal program can have no effect on the integrity or efficacy of a federal
program is to ignore the fact that money is fungible and that federal funds
are often comingled with funds from other sources. Section 666 addresses
this problem by policing the integrity of the entire organization that receives
federal benefits. In sustaining the constitutionality of § 666 under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Eleventh Circuit recently has come to the
same conclusion.
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Second, in order to fall under § 666, transactions must involve property
"valued at $5,000 or more,"'9 ° or bribes must be "in connection with any
business, transaction, or series of transactions ... involving anything of
value of $5,000 or more .... .""' Unlike the Commerce Clause elements
found in a number of federal statutes, which require only that the miscon-
duct "affect interstate commerce" or that there be actual movement across
state lines in relation to the offense, § 666 imposes a non-trivial dollar
threshold for jurisdiction that limits federal prosecution of corruption
involving an identifiable economic harm or relation to valuable commercial
transactions. 92
"9 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i).
'9' Id. § 666(a)(1)(B).
192See United States v. Ferrara, 990 F. Supp. 146, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[T]he
$5,000 value requirement is present to limit federal jurisdiction to significant, i.e.,
important transactions, again viewed from the protected organization's perspec-
tive."); United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("The
$5,000 value requirement is what keeps the statute from making a federal violator
out of the motorist who bribes a federally subsidized police officer with $20 to
avoid a $50 traffic ticket. As such, the $5,000 requirement is the finishing touch on
the federal funds 'hook' that starts with the other requirements that the bribed
agency received substantial federal funds and that the bribe be connected to the
agency business.").
Professor Brown minimizes the value limitations of § 666, arguing that "[ilt is
true that the five thousand dollar valuation requirement would function as
something of a limit, although a large range of transactions and jurisdictions would
be included," and that the federal funds element "is not much of' a limitation
either. Brown, Stealth Statute, supra note 104, at 274-75. The criticism is
misguided because the breadth of the statute alone is irrelevant to the question of
whether it is an impermissible use of federal authority. The important point is that
Congress voluntarily limited the scope of § 666 to reach corruption in most
governmental units that involves a clear economic harm. Professor Brown argues
that the statute is much broader than it appears, and asserts that the provision may
be appealing because prosecutors can use it "without the need to satisfy such
annoying jurisdictional predicates as use of the mails, effect on commerce, or
interstate travel." Id. at 274. While § 666's jurisdictional elements may be easy to
prove in many cases, they impose at least as great a burden on the govemrnment as
does the comparable version of the Hobbs Act, which requires only an effect on
interstate commerce; or the mail fraud statute, which requires only a mailing
incidental to an essential part of the scheme to defraud. See Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989) ("To be part of the execution of the fraud,
however, the use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme ....
It is sufficient for the mailing to be "incident to an essential part of the scheme ....
or 'a step in [the] plot.'" (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394
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Third, the statute reaches only agents of organizations or programs
receiving the federal funds, not simply any person exercising state
authority. Section 666 does not permit prosecution of every instance of
bribery or commercial corruption, but instead only corruption in govern-
ment and those private programs receiving the requisite federal benefits.193
The agency element shows that Congress exercised its authority only in a
limited sphere that implements the Anti-Corruption Legacy of the
Constitution.
Courts seeking to limit the application of § 666 sometimes point to its
sparse legislative history, in which Congress asserted its purpose for
adopting the statute was to permit prosecutions that might have been
precluded had the Supreme Court taken a narrow approach in interpreting
the scope of § 201 in Dixson.'94 Under this view, § 666 is only a limited
measure reaching at most a slightly broader class of defendants than § 201.
The claim that § 666 was a gap-filling provision-and rendered largely
unnecessary after the expansive interpretation of § 201 in Dixson--permits
courts to interpret otherwise broad statutory language to avoid finding that
the statute significantly expanded the federal authority to prosecute
corruption.'
(1916)). The ease with which the government can obtain proof of a jurisdictional
element is irrelevant to the constitutional question of whether Congress can reach
the conduct under its enumerated powers. If the authority exists, then the policy
choice to make a successful prosecution more or less difficult is one left to
Congress and not subject to judicial review.
'93 See, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 143 F.3d 1439, 1441 (11 th Cir. 1998)
(overturning conviction under § 666 for bribery involving Lockheed Corporation,
which was acting as a prime contractor for the Defense Department, because
"organizations engaged in purely commercial transactions with the federal
government are not subject to § 666."); United States v. Pretty, 98 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 1996) ("If [defendant] was an agent of the state, rather than only of the
Treasurer, then § 666 applies to her even if the Treasurer did not benefit from the
federal funds, because the state itself received and benefited from more than
$10,000 in federal funds.").
"'94 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
'95 In United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002), Judge Weiner
argued that early drafts of the provision that eventually became § 666 were much
narrower and would have required proof of a nexus between the federal funds and
the corruption. Id. at 328. While the ultimate congressional purpose is not clear in
the legislative history, Judge Weiner pointed out, "[flor all we know, the [Senate
Judiciary] Committee might well have sought to exercise federal criminal
jurisdiction up to its constitutional limit, leaving the issue to the courts to decide."
Id.
[VOL. 92
FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION
The introduction to the Senate Report on the provision states that the
new section will "augment the ability of the United States to vindicate
significant acts of theft, fraud and bribery involving federal monies .... "'I'
The reference to "federal monies" has been viewed as a basis for recogniz-
ing a requirement that permissible prosecutions under § 666 must embody
some nexus-however that term might be defined-for federal jurisdiction.
The Senate Report's brief description of the provision, which is the entirety
of the legislative history, notes only that the law redressed a "serious gap"
by "assuring the integrity of such program funds" and would reach
corruption that might not be covered by § 201.197 An earlier draft of the
provision would have required proof of a nexus, but Congress did not enact
that bill. 9 The legislative history for § 666 does not refer to any additional
requirement that prosecutors must demonstrate the federal interest beyond
the elements set forth in the statute.
The broad language of § 666 permits courts to rely on federalism as a
separate limit on the Spending Clause, rewriting the statute to rein in
federal prosecutors and to prevent prosecution of crimes a judge may label
"truly local."'99 Employing federalism as the basis for imposing an external
196 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 369 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3510.
'97 Id. The Report specifically mentioned the circuit court decisions in Del Toro,
Hinton, and Mosley as cases that could be prosecuted under the new provision. Id.
at 3511.
98s The 1981 bill, proposing federal criminal code revisions concerning theft
and commercial bribery, premised federal jurisdiction over agents of state and local
governments or their fiduciaries who are "charged... with administering monies
or property derived from a federal program ..." United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing S. 1630, 97th Cong., § 175 l(c)(1)). The Senate Report
on § 666 stated that the provision "is derived from S. 1630, the Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1981 approved by the Committee in the 97th Congress." S. REP. No.
98-225, at 369 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510. In Coyne, 4
F.3d at 100, the Second Circuit noted that the 98th Congress' decision not to adopt
this section suggested that it did not wish for prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 666
to be limited to "property or conduct related to a program directly funded by the
federal government." Id. at 110.
'9' The Court in Dixson contrasted its interpretation of § 201 with a broader
approach by noting that "we do not mean to suggest that the mere presence of some
federal assistance brings a local organization and its employees within the
jurisdiction of the federal bribery statute or even that all employees of local
organizations responsible for administering federal grant programs are public
officials within the meaning of section 201 (a)." United States v. Dixson, 465 U.S.
482, 499 (1984). Section 666 is exactly the type of statute described in Dixson, and
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constraint on the application of § 666 contradicts the approach Congress
took to protect not just federal funds but also the integrity of state and local
governments. 00 The federal interest in preventing and punishing corruption
supports the broad reading of § 666 in Salinas and Fischer as a powerful
anti-corruption statute that reaches misconduct beyond what other federal
criminal statutes had covered.2'
Judicial discomfort with federal involvement in prosecuting state and
local officials does not provide a basis for courts to restrict the authority of
Congress to redress corruption in a broad array of programs, both those
administered by state and local governments and those operated through
private organizations that receive federal funds. Congress expanded the
scope of federal authority in § 666 to make it clear that federal prosecutors
can target corruption in most governmental units and private programs
receiving substantial federal support. Using federalism's purported limiting
effect on the Spending Clause as the basis for imposing a vague external
limit on § 666 to protect conduct that a court perceives as "truly local"
contradicts congressional intent by impermissibly undermining a legitimate
exercise of federal authority.
C. Extortion Under Color of Official Right: The Hobbs Act
Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946 as a successor to the Anti-
Racketeering Act of 1934,202 which the Supreme Court interpreted narrowly
Congress' intent in adopting the new provision was to ensure that there was broad
federal authority to prosecute state and local corruption.2oo See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 952 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The $10,000
threshold requirement and the $5000 transactional requirement create a sufficient
nexus between the offense conduct and federal funds to ensure that federal power
will not be extended to the prosecution of merely local matters that may not
jeopardize in any significant manner the integrity of federal programs."); United
States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1327 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("Indeed, for Congress to
exercise its spending power effectively, it must be assured that the instrumentalities
through which the federal government pursues comprehensive aims can be trusted
to apply appropriated funds toward their intended objectives,").
21 See United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
("Congress did not write in the bribery provision, 'anything belonging to the
agency of value of $5,000 or more,' although it could have. Rather, Congress left
that particular provision less specific. [This] Court takes that lack of specificity not
to be an inadvertent slip-up in otherwise precise drafting, but instead, deliberately
broad drafting.").
202 Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2003)).
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in United States v. Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters20 3
to exclude racketeering activity related to labor disputes. The Hobbs Act
reaches robbery and extortion that affect commerce, and it defines extortion
as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right.2 °4 The statute is an exercise of the commerce power, and
the Court stated that the provision "manifest[s] a purpose to use all the
constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence. 2 °5
203 United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
204 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added). The Hobbs Act provides:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section--
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against
his will, by means of actual or threatened .force, or violence, or fear of
injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his
custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member
of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of
Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all
commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the
District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce
between points within the same State through any place outside such
State; and all other commerce over which the United States has
jurisdiction.
Id. § 1951.
205 Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). The Hobbs Act applies
to every robbery and extortion that "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce .... "
18 U.S.C. § 195 l(a). Courts have found that the Hobbs Act requires only that the
government prove the misconduct had a "minimal impact" on commerce. United
States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1388 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
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The Hobbs Act does not specifically address corruption, but in the early
1970s federal prosecutors sought to charge under the Act state and local
officials who accepted bribes and kickbacks. The prosecutors argued that
the acceptance of an unauthorized benefit by a local official constituted
extortion under color of official right.20 6 Lower courts readily agreed to the
government's interpretation of extortion as the equivalent of accepting
bribes, a position that was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court.20 7
The Hobbs Act became one of the primary weapons for prosecuting bribery
that fell outside § 201 because of that statute's limitation to federal officials
and those exercising federal authority.20 8
Even before the Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, Justice
Thomas raised federalism concerns about the application of the Hobbs Act
to local officials not directly responsible to the federal government. In
Evans v. United States,2°9 the Court, in upholding the Hobbs Act conviction
of a local elected official, rejected the argument that extortion requires the
official to have initiated or induced the corrupt payment rather than being
a passive recipient of a bribe.210 Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that
206 See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 n.5 (1991) ("Until the
early 1970's, extortion prosecutions under the Hobbs Act rested on allegations that
the consent of the transferor of property had been 'induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear'; public officials had not been
prosecuted under the 'color of official right' phrase standing alone. Beginning with
the conviction involved in United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1972),
however, the federal courts accepted the Government's submission that because of
the disjunctive language of § 1951 (b)(2), allegations of force, violence, or fear
were not necessary. Only proof of the obtaining ofproperty under claims of official
right was necessary.").
207 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992) ("Extortion by the
pubic official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as 'taking
a bribe.'").
208 See Peter D. Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo
Requirement in Public Corruption Prosecutions under the Hobbs Act, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 409, 411 (1995) ("This interpretation of the Hobbs Act, which
obviated the need to demonstrate coercion on the part of a public official, paved the
way for the Hobbs Act to blossom into an especially effective antibribery statute.").
209 Evans, 504 U.S. at 255.
2 0 Id. at 265-66 ("First, we think the word 'induced' is a part of the definition
of the offense by the private individual, but not the offense by the public offi-
cial.... Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the word 'induced' applied
to the public officeholder, we do not believe the word 'induced' necessarily
indicates that the transaction must be initiated by the recipient of the bribe."). The
defendant, a county commissioner in Georgia, was first approached by an under-
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"[o]ver the past 20 years, the Hobbs Act has served as the engine for a
stunning expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction into a field traditionally
policed by state and local laws-acts of public corruption by state and local
officials., 21  Relying on statements in United States v. Bass 2 2 and Gregory
v. Ashcroft213 that expressed concern with the effect of broad interpretations
of federal law that would intrude on areas traditionally subject to state
regulation, Justice Thomas asserted that the application of the Hobbs Act
to local officials amounted to a regulation of state governments that
"mocks" earlier decisions limiting the power of Congress to regulate the
states.214
cover FBI agent offering a bribe for assistance on a zoning matter that was to come
before the county commission for approval. Id. at 257.
211 Id. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
2 13 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
214 Evans, 504 U.S. at 294 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Bass, the Court
interpreted the elements of a gun possession statute and noted "a second principle
supporting today's result: unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not
be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." Bass, 404 U.S.
at 349. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court cited Bass for the proposition that an
interpretation of legislation that significantly altered the federal-state balance
required a clear expression of congressional intent. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. In
both cases, the Court invoked the federal-state balance in support of its narrow
interpretation of the statute at issue. The Court did not, however, find that Congress
lacked the authority to legislate in the area if it chose to do so, but instead only that
Congress must make that intention clearer. The cases do not appear to construct an
impenetrable barrier to federal regulation, as Justice Thomas' dissent implies.
Justice Thomas also questioned the decision by the federal prosecutor to pursue
the case, stating that "[o]ur criminal justice system runs on the premise that
prosecutors will respect, and courts will enforce, the boundaries on criminal
conduct set by the legislature. Where, as here, those boundaries are breached, it
becomes impossible to tell where prosecutorial discretion ends and prosecutorial
abuse, or even discrimination, begins." Evans, 504 U.S. at 296. Justice Thomas was
troubled by the use of undercover agents offering bribes as a means to investigate
local elected officials; this method of apprehension had the appearance of federal
officials inducing local representatives to engage in criminal conduct. He did not
argue that the defendant was entrapped. Instead, he asserted that the conduct did
not violate the statute because the Court's opinion impermissibly created a new
offense through its "expansive interpretation of the crime. But that interpretation
has no basis in the statute that Congress passed in 1946." Id. The propriety of the
government's investigative techniques does not have any relevance to the issue of
the constitutionality of a statute.
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Justice Thomas misconstrued the application of federalism to criminal
laws because he mistakenly viewed the Hobbs Act as regulating the
conduct of the states and their officials in matters of official policy, similar
to the legislation at issue in Gregory v. Ashcroft. The Hobbs Act reaches
the misuse of governmental authority; thus, it is not a regulation of the
states or a limit on their power. That the defendants may be state and local
officials, also subject to prosecution by the states for their conduct, does
not remove them from the power of the federal government. In United
States v. Gillock,1 5 the Court rejected the argument that federalism
required the federal courts to recognize a privilege similar to the Speech or
Debate Clause that would prohibit the use of state legislative acts and
statements as evidence of a Hobbs Act violation by a state senator.2 6 The
Court noted that criminal prosecutions act only on the individual official
and not the state, so that "recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state
legislators for their legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of
the Federal Government in enforcing its criminal statutes with only
speculative benefit to the state legislative process."" 7 The Court concluded,
"In the absence of a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to
make state officials, like all other persons, subject to federal criminal
sanctions, we discern no basis in these circumstances for a judicially
created limitation that handicaps proof of the relevant facts." '218
Gillock recognized that the federal authority to prosecute corruption by
state and local officials may have some tangential effect on the operation
of the states, but the national government has a powerful interest in
enforcing its corruption laws even when there is some interference with the
exercise of state power. Federalism does not operate as a separate limit on
the prosecution of corruption, nor does it mean that crimes already subject
to state prosecution presumptively should be removed from the authority
of the federal government.
215 United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
216 The Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, el. 1, prohibits the
government from, inter alia, introducing any of the legislative acts of Senators and
Representatives in a prosecution of that official. See United States v. Helstoski,
442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979) ("The Clause protects 'against inquiry into acts that
occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for
those acts."' (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972))). The
Tennessee Constitution also provides a Speech or Debate protection in state
prosecutions. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 13.
217 Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
218Id. at 374.
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The broad commerce element in the Hobbs Act also has caused
some lower court judges to assail the application of the Hobbs Act to
robberies traditionally prosecuted by local authorities. In United States v.
McFarland2"9 and United States v. Hickman,220 a substantial block of Fifth
Circuit judges twice questioned the statute's application to a series of
small-scale robberies. These judges dissented from the affirmance of the
convictions by an equally divided en banc court in both cases. In
McFarland, the dissenting judges asserted,
There is no sufficient rational basis to aggregate the effects on interstate
commerce of any of the four individual prototypically local crimes of
violence here prosecuted with the effects on interstate commerce of all the
undifferentiated mass of robberies covered by the Hobbs Act's general
proscription of any and all robberies that "in any way or degree... affect
... commerce."
221
In Hickman, the dissenting judges argued that these "Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions exceeded Congress's authority,' 222 because permitting prosecutors to
establish the commerce element by aggregating the effect of the robberies
meant that "[t]aking a child's lemonade is as potentially covered as any
other robbery, at least as long as we are free to aggregate all robberies. 223
Neither McFarland nor Hickman was a public corruption case, and the
dissenting judges' position relied on the need to limit federal authority over
crimes of violence that did not involve commercial activity.224 If the Hobbs
219 United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 155 L. Ed. 515 (2003).
220 United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230,231 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting from affirmance of conviction by an equally divided en banc court).
221 McFarland, 311 F.3d at 409 (Garwood, J., dissenting).
222 Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
223 Id.; see also United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1145 (2003) (upholding Hobbs Act conviction for robbery,
but noting that "[w]e are troubled, however, by the inability of the government's
lawyer either in his brief or at argument to suggest a limiting principle in Hobbs
Act prosecutions, despite the Supreme Court's evident concern not to allow the
concept of 'commerce' (interstate or foreign) to expand to the point at which every
transaction in the American economy would be within Congress's reach").224 See McFarland, 311 F.3d at 396 (Garwood, J., dissenting) ("Robbery is the
'activity' regulated by the Hobbs Act, and we conclude that for these purposes
robbery cannot be considered a commercial activity."). The dissenting judges
analyzed only a violation of the Hobbs Act through conduct constituting the
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Act does not apply to that type of crime because of federalism limitations
on the Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate such activity, then
there could be a sharp distinction between the application of the law to
public corruption and to robberies and extortion involving violence and
threats. Because they do not often involve the economic motivation
required for an exercise of the commerce power, violent crimes are often
viewed by the Supreme Court as falling within the traditional domain of the
police power retained by the states. Extortion under color of official right,
however, involves a quid pro quo exchange of something of value for the
exercise--or non-exercise---of governmental power.225 The corrupt
transaction is fundamentally an economic one in which the official seeks
to benefit personally from the misuse of authority. Unlike the attenuated
effect on commerce from the presence of weapons near schools or from
gender-motivated violence, corruption of public officials entails the
misuse of office for personal economic gain. While bribery is an offense
with roots in the common law, that background alone does not change the
fundamental nature of the transaction as an essentially economic exchange
among willing actors.227
common law offense of robbery; they did not address extortion under color of
official right as a form of commercial activity.
225 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,260 (1992) (holding that extortion
under color of official right is essentially bribery).226 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
227 The Court's language in Morrison indicated that if conduct was criminal,
then it was not economic or commercial in nature. The Court asserted that "a fair
reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at
issue was central to our decision in that case," and that "[g]ender-motivated crimes
of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." Morrison, 529
U.S. at 613. While the crimes at issue in Lopez and Morrison involved no real
economic activity, it is unlikely that the Court meant that every act that can be
labeled a crime under the common law and subject to prosecution by state and local
authorities is outside the authority of Congress to regulate under the Commerce
Clause. Economic regulation includes the authority to prohibit conduct and punish
instances in which it occurs. The Court's distinction between economic and non-
economic activities is not subject to any bright-line test, and has been criticized for
its oversimplified view of activities subject to legal regulation. See Michael
Richard Dimino, Recent Development, Yes, Virginia (Tech), Our Government Is
One of Limited Powers: United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 913 (2001) ("There is nothing intrinsically
economic about any activity. What makes something economic or noneconomic is
the context in which it is viewed.... The Court's failure to take into account the
context of the activity is likely to result in future difficulties.").
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The Hobbs Act's prohibition on extortion under color of official right
is a form of commercial regulation that prohibits public officials from using
their governmental authority for personal enrichment. Bribery is a criminal
offense regardless of the propriety of the decision tainted by the payment,
i.e., whether the exercise of authority harmed or advanced the public
interest is irrelevant. While most decisions tainted by corruption are open
to question, the transaction subject to congressional regulation is the quid
pro quo arrangement to misuse public authority for personal gain. The
Hobbs Act prohibits an economic exchange, so while it may seem odd to
view a criminal statute as a form of commercial regulation, the anti-
corruption form of extortion meets the criteria for a proper exercise of the
commerce power as set forth in Lopez and Morrison. The fact that the
states have long prosecuted corruption in state and local government is not
relevant to the constitutional analysis of the relationship of extortion under
color of official right to the Commerce Clause.
D. The Right of Honest Services: § 1346
The Mail Fraud statute is among the most frequently used federal
provisions for prosecuting economic crimes. Shortly after the Civil War,
Congress first adopted an anti-fraud statute based on the use of the mails
to combat illegal interstate lotteries."' It gradually expanded the law to
reach a broad array of deceitful schemes that included any use of the mails
as an aspect of the crime.229 Although the statute's roots are traceable to the
common law crime of larceny by trick2 3 -a theft offense involving a
228 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196. The act provided that
"it shall not be lawful to deposit in a post-office, to be sent by mail, any letters or
circulars concerning lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises
offering prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever."
229 In 1872, as part of a revision of the postal statutes, Congress expanded the
lottery law to make it unlawful to "devise any scheme or artifice to defraud ... by
means of the post-office establishment of the United States.... ." Act of June 8,
1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (1872). Congress adopted the Wire Fraud statute
in 1952 as an extension of the Mail Fraud statute to a newer form of communica-
tion, and courts interpret the two statutes identically in determining whether the
conduct constitutes a scheme to defraud. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S.
19, 25 n.6 (1987) ("The mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in
relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis....").
230 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 32.10[B] (3d ed.
2001) ("The primary difference between larceny and false pretenses is that a thief
who uses trickery to secure title, and not simply possession, of property, is guilty
of false pretenses; one who merely secures possession through fraud is guilty of
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misstatement of past or present fact-the Supreme Court held early on that
the provision reaches much more misconduct than the common law
offense."' The statute has continued to expand, and now covers both the
use of the postal system and shipments by "private or commercial interstate
carriers. 232
1. Development of the Right of Honest Services Theory of Fraud
Just as they used the Hobbs Act as an anti-corruption tool, federal
prosecutors applied the Mail Fraud statute to instances of both public and
private corruption involving dishonesty even though the statute's terms did
larceny by trick."); Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How
Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 157, 182-86 (2001) (reviewing the development of the common law
offenses based on false or misleading statements to obtain possession or title to
property).
231 See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) ("It was with the
purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and
to prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect, that this statute
was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it to such cases as disclose an
actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is
only the allurement of a specious and glittering promise."); SARAH WELLING ET AL.,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS § 17.3, at 6 (1998) ("Durland was
a much more radical decision, since it cut the mail fraud statute loose from its
common law moorings and established that federal mail fraud was not limited to
the scope of frauds punishable under state law.").
232 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commer-
cial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned ....
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not specifically embrace corruption.233 The relationship between corruption
and fraud-a type of larceny-is not immediately apparent. Federal
prosecutors linked the Mail Fraud statute to corrupt activities by alleging
that public officials and employees who breached a fiduciary duty by acting
dishonestly for their own benefit deprived the public or an employer of the
intangible right of honest services. 3 Courts accepted the position that a
deprivation of the honest services owed by a fiduciary constituted the
fraudulent taking that is normally associated with larceny and therefore
sufficient to establish a scheme to defraud. Once recognized by the courts,
this anti-corruption theory of mail fraud permitted a wide range of federal
prosecutions of state and local officials. The Mail Fraud statute provided
prosecutors with two advantages over other anti-corruption statutes. First,
the mailing element was relatively easy to establish because the use of the
mails need only be incident to an essential part of the scheme.2" Second,
the statute did not require proof of a quid pro quo or other nefarious
arrangement between an official and a third party, only that officials and
employees breached a fiduciary duty by being dishonest in carrying out
their responsibilities.
Although the lower federal courts readily embraced the intangible
rights theory, the Supreme Court abruptly rejected it in McNally v. United
States.236 The Court held that the Mail Fraud statute reached only schemes
233 See Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435, 460-61 (1995)
("Beginning in the 1970s, federal prosecutors began using the mail fraud statute to
attack political corruption at the federal, state and local level.").
234 See Daniel W. Hurson, Comment, Mail Fraud, the Intangible Rights
Doctrine, and the Infusion of State Law: A Bermuda Triangle of Sorts, 38 Hous.
L. REv. 297, 303-04 (2001) ("The [intangible rights] doctrine is based on the belief
that certain individuals are entitled to the honest and faithful services of
another.... Failure to provide the entitled services, coupled with the use of the
mails in furtherance of the failure, is a crime subject to prosecution under the mail
fraud statute.").235 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,710-11 (1989); Henning, supra
note 233, at 458 ("Schmuck effectively reduces the mailing element to a mere
jurisdictional requirement."); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43
S.C. L. REV. 223, 262 (1992) ("[M]ail fraud convictions may turn on the
distastefulness of the fraud, as opposed to whether the mailing actually served to
further the fraudulent scheme.").
236 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The government charged a
scheme to defraud the citizens of Kentucky of the right of honest services through
a kickback scheme by state officials involving the award of workers compensation
insurance contracts Id. at 352-54. Although the defendants received a significant
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to deprive victims of money or property, and not the deprivation of
intangible rights "such as the right to have public officials perform their
duties honestly., 23' The Court's rationale for limiting the statute referred
vaguely to federalism concerns-although they were not labeled as
such-when it noted:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer bound-
aries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards
of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read
§ 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress
desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.238
McNally did not reject congressional authority to reach state and local
corruption through criminal statutes. The Court hypothesized in a footnote
that Congress could make the conduct of a state official a federal crime
even if the state itself authorized the conduct:
It may well be that Congress could criminalize using the mails to further
a state officer's efforts to profit from governmental decisions he is
empowered to make or over which he has some supervisory authority,
even if there is no state law proscribing his profiteering or even if state
law expressly authorized it.
239
The reticence to read the Mail Fraud statute broadly reflected the Court's
concern with interpreting a law that had no clear connection to corruption.
Therefore, McNally adopted a narrow-if somewhat crabbed-reading of
the provision and then invited Congress to respond. The Court did not,
however, find that Congress lacked the authority to reach state and local
corruption; instead, it recognized that a clearer statement from Congress
amount of money from an insurance broker, it was unclear whether the state paid
higher insurance preniums because of the scheme, and the government did not try
to prove that the state suffered any loss from the defendants' conduct.237 Id. at 358.
238 Id. at 360.
239 Id. at 361 n.9. The latter part of the Court's dicta is hard to defend under
federalism principles after New York v. United States, because it would entail a
federal proscription of conduct that a state explicitly chose to permit. In that case,
the federal government would be coercing a state official to refrain from acting in
a way that the state determined is proper. Unlike other instances of corruption, in
which there is a misuse of power for personal gain, when a state authorizes conduct
there is no abuse of public authority.
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would remove any doubt about the scope of the provision, apparently
including any constitutional doubt.
Congress indeed responded to the Court's invitation in McNally in
short order by adopting § 1346, which provides that the Mail Fraud statute
"includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services."24 Although the legislative history of the provision is
minimal, it clearly revived the anti-corruption application of the Mail Fraud
statute by restoring the law to its state prior to McNally."'
Since McNally, courts have refined the right of honest services analysis
by focusing on the relationship between the dishonesty of the official or
employee and the benefit derived from the breach of fiduciary duty. In
United States v. Sawyer,242 the First Circuit stated that giving improper gifts
to a state legislator did not violate the Mail Fraud statute unless the
government could also prove that the defendant "intended to deceive the
public about that conduct. 243 In United States v. Czubinski,244 the same
court found that § 1346 required that "either some articulable harm must
befall the holder of the information as a result of defendant's activities, or
some gainful use must be intended by the person accessing the informa-
tion., 245 In United States v. Bloom, 246 the Seventh Circuit summarized the
240 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
241 See 134 CONG. REC. 33,296-97 (Oct. 21, 1988) (statement ofRep. Conyers).
Congress considered broader anti-corruption measures, but rejected them and
instead adopted § 1346, which does little more than reverse McNally's rejection of
the right of honest services form of mail fraud without discussing how courts
should interpret the scope of the provision. See Hurson, supra note 234, at 321
("[T]he legislative history of the statute is sparse. The existing history, however,
clearly states that Congress's intent enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 was to overturn
McNally and reinstate the intangible rights doctrine."); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 14 n.76 (2001)
(reviewing unenacted proposals to create a broad federal anti-corruption statute).
242 United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
243 Id. at 733.
244 United States v. Czubinski 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997).
245 Id. at 1074. The defendant worked for the Internal Revenue Service and
made unauthorized searches of income tax returns. The government charged that
the conduct violated the Wire Fraud statute because the IRS regulations prohibited
unauthorized browsing of tax returns, thereby depriving the employer of the right
of honest services. The First Circuit reversed the conviction because the defendant
did not realize any personal gain from his violation of the internal rules of the
agency: "[N]o rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, when
Czubinski was browsing taxpayer files, he was doing so in furtherance of a scheme
to use the information he browsed for private purposes, be they nefarious or
otherwise." Id. at 1075.
246 United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
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requirement for a Mail Fraud violation for corruption: "Misuse of office
(more broadly, misuse of position) for private gain is the line that separates
run of the mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty . . . from federal
crime. 247
The deprivation of the right of honest services need not cause
pecuniary harm to the victim, in the same sense that a theft results in the
victim suffering a loss. 248 Moreover, unlike a traditional larceny, under
247 Id. at 655. In United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), the Fifth Circuit held that a violation of the honest services provision by a
state official required proof that the "services must be owed under state law and...
that they were in fact not delivered." Id. at 734. The circuit court focused on
whether the breach of fiduciary duty was serious enough to violate the state's law
and not just a breach of ethical guidelines for state officers, which would violate
principles of federalism by involving the federal government in enforcing a code
of conduct for state officials. Id. The Fifth Circuit's focus on state law as a means
to avoid a federalism problem may sound odd, in that it requires the federal courts
to ascertain the meaning of state law and find a violation of it as a condition to
federal prosecution. See Hurson, supra note 234, at 319 ("Public officials whose
conduct previously may at best have violated a state law (even one without
significant penalties) will now have to be extra vigilant of the federal avengers, for
a violation of a state law may now be all that the federal government needs to
initiate an honest services mail fraud prosecution.").
If Brumley required only a violation of a state law without proof of a gain to the
defendant, then the decision may be misguided. The Fifth Circuit's reason for
focusing on state law, however, was that only serious misuses of authority are
appropriate for federal prosecution, so that if the state imposed a duty to perform
the services then the failure to adhere to that requirement would cause a significant
harm. Implicit in a mail fraud prosecution is the requirement that the defendant
engage in deceitful conduct for a reason, i.e., to realize a gain or deprive the victim
of something of value. Brumley did not dispense with the requirement that the
defendant gain a benefit through the violation of the state-imposed duty. While
certainly inartful in its reliance on state law to constitute a federal offense, the Fifth
Circuit imposed the requirement to ensure that mail fraud prosecutions involve the
significant federal interests in punishing corruption at all levels of government and
not simply instances of questionable conduct by public officials.
248 In cases involving the deprivation of the right of honest services in a private
setting, rather than misuse of office by a public official, courts require proof that
it was reasonably foreseeable that the breach of fiduciary duty would result in an
economic harm to the victim. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 260
(2d Cir. 2002) ("[I]t was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the scheme
could result in some economic or pecuniary harm to the victim that is more than de
minimis .... "); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The
prosecution must prove that the employee intended to breach a fiduciary duty, and
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§ 1346 the gain to the miscreant need not be traceable to the harm or loss
suffered by the victim. The violation results from the deception by the
defendant, which breaches the defendant's fiduciary duty and triggers a
personal gain to which the defendant is not otherwise entitled. 249 Thus
interpreted, the Mail Fraud statute is a potent anti-corruption measure
because it does not require the kind of two-party exchange on which the
other federal statutes in this area are premised. The misuse of authority to
reward friends or divert benefits to oneself is a scheme to defraud because
the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty is deceptive, and the gain is a fraud
perpetrated on those who expect the person to exercise authority honestly.
2. Constitutional Authority for Right of Honest Services Prosecutions
Section 1346 would appear to address the federalism concern expressed
in McNally regarding the scope of an ambiguous provision that reached the
conduct of state and local officials. In Cleveland v. United States, 250 the
Court revisited the scope of the Mail Fraud statute and relied on McNally
to reject a conviction involving misconduct at the local level. 25' The
defendants in Cleveland were private individuals who made false state-
ments to obtain a state-issued gambling license, and the federal government
charged a mail fraud violation for depriving the state of property. The Court
held that unissued licenses held by the state were not property within the
meaning of the statute, thus reaffirming the position it took in McNally that
schemes to obtain property are limited to property that has an economic
value in the hands of the victim.
252
Cleveland did not work a significant change in the scope of the Mail
Fraud statute, as McNally did through its narrow interpretation that
temporarily eliminated the right of honest services theory of prosecution.
In supporting its conclusion that an unissued license was not property, the
that the employee foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen that his employer
might suffer an economic harm as a result of the breach.").
249 See Moohr, supra note 241, at 48 ("In these frauds, the defendant uses his
or her position to realize a goal of obtaining some benefit. Using the actor's
ultimate objective--to accept a bribe, to convert property to his or her own use, or
exploit a conflict of interest-focuses the inquiry on the defendant's purpose,
whether that objective causes a loss to the victim of the deceit or a gain of a benefit
from a third party.").
210 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
25, Id. at 26-27.
252 See id. at 22 ("If Cleveland defrauded the State of 'property,' the nature of
that property cannot be economic.").
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Court noted that permitting such a prosecution "would subject to federal
prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and
local authorities, '253 and that "[a]bsent clear statement by Congress, we will
not read the mail fraud statute to place under federal superintendence a vast
array of conduct traditionally policed by the States. 254 Unlike the concern
expressed in McNally about federal interference in the operation of state
and local governments, Cleveland adopted the rationale of Lopez and
Morrison that federal prosecution of crimes "traditionally regulated by state
and local authorities ' 255 is problematic. The Court did not cite any of its
federalism decisions to explain its position, although the language clearly
implied at least a concern with the scope of the Mail Fraud statute based on
federalism limitations.
Although McNally and Cleveland refer obliquely to federalism
concerns, the Court has never had to address directly the question of
whether federalism imposes any substantive limit on the Mail Fraud statute.
Unlike the Hobbs Act, which is based on the Commerce Clause, the Mail
Fraud statute is based in part on the Postal Clause, which authorizes
Congress to "establish Post Offices and Post roads. 25 6 Congress has
exclusive authority over the postal system, and the Court early on upheld
the validity of the Mail Fraud statute as a proper excise of that power when
coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause.257 The statute links the
common law offense of larceny by trick with congressional authority over
the mails to create a federal crime. The criminal prohibition originated in
an era when local scam artists took advantage of an expanding economy to
extend their reach through the mails to carry out frauds on a larger scale,
253 Id. at 24.
254 Id. at 27.
...Id. at 14.
256 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. Professor Kurland criticized the use of the
Postal Clause, rather than the Guarantee Clause, as the basis for enacting § 1346,
because the right of honest services provision "merely reinstates and perpetuates
many of the irrational loopholes and inconsistencies inherent in tying the use of the
intangible rights theory to cases where a sufficient use of the mails or wires can be
established." Kurland, Guarantee Clause, supra note 66, at 490.
257 See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878) ("The right to designate what
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be ex-
cluded."); see also Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) (Congress
has the authority to prohibit the use of the mails to carry out a fraudulent scheme
"whether it can forbid the scheme or not.").
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and the federal statute was a response to a type of criminal activity that
traditionally came within the authority of the states to prosecute.
The postal power is an exclusive grant of authority to Congress to
establish and control the federal postal system,259 and the Court has not
hesitated to uphold congressional power under the clause to punish misuse
of that system. In Exparte Rapier,26" decided in 1892, the Court rejected
an argument that the Mail Fraud statute was unconstitutional because
258 Congress expanded the Mail Fraud statute in 1994 to include-the use of "any
private or commercial interstate carrier" in executing the fraudulent scheme. 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2003), amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087. This part of the
statute is based on the commerce power, rather than the postal power. In Lopez, the
Court explained that
we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce ....
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
Under the tripartite division of congressional commerce power described in Lopez,
the provision comes within the second category (protection of an instrumentality
of interstate commerce) and not the third category (activities that affect interstate
commerce). See Henning, supra note 233, at 472 (The interstate or commercial
carrier element of the Mail Fraud statute "is similar to the second category of
statutes [under Lopez], requiring proof that an instrumentality of interstate
commerce is used for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme."). The
statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison purported to be an exercise of congressio-
nal authority to regulate non-commercial conduct that indirectly affected interstate
commerce. This required the Court to give close scrutiny to whether the conduct
had the requisite effect under the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the Court noted
that the gender-motivated violence was not an economic activity, and therefore
pushed federal authority into an area--violent crime--traditionally regulated by the
states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Even if the private or
commercial carrier basis for a mail fraud prosecution falls in the third Lopez
category, the crime involves economic activity--the gain to the defendant from the
scheme and the loss by a victim. Unlike the statutes the Court invalidated in Lopez
and Morrison, the Mail Fraud statute stands on a substantially stronger footing
under the Commerce Clause.
259 See supra note 256.
26 0Exparte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
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Congress could not regulate acts that had traditionally been subject to state
criminal laws. The Court held, "It is not necessary that congress should
have the power to deal with crime or immorality within the states in order
to maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of the mails in
aid of the perpetration of crime or immorality. ' 261 The Mail Fraud statute
necessarily incorporates a substantial overlap with state law offenses
because Congress enacted the statute to reach a common law offense
that was being executed in a new way involving the use of a federal
facility.
262
The Court's reference in Cleveland to the divide between state and
federal authority misconstrued the scope of congressional authority under
the postal power. While the Commerce Clause analysis in Lopez and
Morrison invalidated statutes at the outer limit of the Commerce Clause,
the Mail Fraud statute is based, in part, on a different source of constitu-
tional authority. To the extent that the statute is an exercise of congressio-
nal authority over the mails, it is not clear why federalism limitations on the
commerce power to reach local crimes would be relevant. In the early
challenges to the Mail Fraud statute, the Court readily accepted the fact that
the law reaches crimes already subject to state prosecution because the
federal interest arises from the use of a facility of the national government
over which Congress has exclusive control. Moreover, even that part of the
statute based on the Commerce Clause involves a stronger basis for
congressional regulation---protection of the channels of interstate
commerce-than a statute based only on the indirect effects of conduct on
interstate commerce.
Federalism limits the scope of Congress' authority to regulate
commerce, but it does not impose an impenetrable barrier between what
may be considered truly national and truly local with regard to every
regulation under that grant of power. The federal and state governments do
not operate in a disjunctive fashion, and there has always been a substantial
261Id. at 134; see also Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732 (The Court held that the power
granted to Congress under the Postal Clause "embraces the regulation of the entire
postal system of the country. The right to designate what shall be carried
necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded.").
262 See Rapier, 143 U.S. at 134 ("When the power to establish postoffices and
post-roads was surrendered to the congress, it was as a complete power; and the
grant carried with it the right to exercise all the powers which made that power
effective. It is not necessary that congress should have the power to deal with crime
or immorality within the states in order to maintain that it possesses the power to
forbid the use of the mails in aid of the perpetrations of crime or immorality.").
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overlap in the criminal authority of each level of government.263 As the
origins of the Mail Fraud statute demonstrate, conduct subject to local
prosecution can also implicate strong federal interests, which permit
Congress to exercise its power to enact criminal legislation to reach the
same acts.
The federal interest includes the prosecution of public corruption, and
§ 1346 is a clear congressional mandate that federal authority can be used
to police misconduct by state and local officials.2" The scope of the
provision is broad, but it does not interfere with or denigrate the power of
the states by allowing for federal prosecution of conduct that is not
otherwise improper.265 While the Court in McNally expressed concern that
263 See Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 412
(2003) ("The assertion in Morrison--and to a lesser extent in Lopez--that
federalism required that the states have exclusive authority over some types of
criminal conduct is flawed because the Court's premise is unsupportable."); Susan
R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in CriminalLaw, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541,
1553 (2002) ("[W]here federal criminal laws regulate conduct already regulated by
the states, such federal legislation does not displace the state criminal-justice
system, but rather supplements it with concurrent jurisdiction."). But see George
D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud, State Law and
Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225,252-53 (1997) [hereinafter Brown,
Corruption] ("[A]ssertions of authority under any grant of power should now be
open to question in order to preserve the principle of a limited national government
which Chief Justice Rehnquist identified [in Lopez] as fundamental. If it is a stretch
to go from 'commerce' to regulating guns near schools, it may also be a stretch to
go from 'establishing Post Offices and Post Roads' to criminalizing misconduct by
state and local officials."). Professor Brown argues that federalism provides an
"external limit" on Congress that can be enforced by the courts to limit the scope
of its power to enact legislation, and that the interpretation of § 1346 be based on
whether the conduct violated state law; this test would avoid federal interference.
Id. at 261. It is not clear whether the argument is that § 1346 is unconstitutional if
there is no reference to state law, or whether particular prosecutions might be
impermissible under principles of federalism. That distinction is important because
federalism limits the power to Congress to regulate, but if the statute is a proper
exercise of constitutional authority, then particular prosecutions would be
constitutional so long as the elements of the crime can be established.
264 See Rapier, 143 U.S. at 134 ("[I]t must be left to congress, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, to determine in what manner it will exercise the power it
undoubtedly possesses.").
265 Professor Brown asserts that the right of honest services provision might
interfere with the role of the states as "laboratories" for experimentation, a valuable
role for the states that is protected by federalism. Brown, Corruption, supra note
263, at 275. The argument is that federal prosecutions usurp the power of the states
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the right of honest services theory of fraud might somehow inject the
federal government into setting ethical standards for the states, 266 the
application of § 1346 shows that the statute requires proof of the misuse of
authority for personal gain and not simply the breach of a vague notion of
fairness or moral virtue.2 67 The Constitution's Anti-Corruption Legacy
by enabling the federal government to criminalize the exercise of legitimate state
power in a mail fraud case. The problem with the argument as applied to the Mail
Fraud statute is that the federal law does not preclude or inhibit the states from
adopting their own approaches to the exercise of their authority unless the
individual official is using the authority for personal gain. While references to the
states as laboratories of innovation has strong rhetorical appeal, it is unlikely that
a federal prosecution will ever involve conduct by a local official that is explicitly
authorized by a state government because there would be no deprivation of the
honest services owed to the state and citizenry. More importantly, § 1346 reaches
the misuse of authority, so there is no federal interference with the state's exercise
of its authority or autonomy, except to the extent that a dishonest official who is
convicted of mail fraud under § 1346 may not be available for future work, a trivial
loss.266 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (refusing to interpret the
statute in a way that "involves the Federal Government in setting standards of
disclosure and good government for local and state officials").
267 But see Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government's
Authority to Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some
Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 715 (2000)
(Federal prosecutors have used § 1346 "to reach conduct on the part of state and
local officials that would be subject, at most, to discipline or removal from office
under federal ethical rules."). Professor Beale argues that, in order to avoid
expanding federal jurisdiction, § 1346 should be limited to cases which could be
charged as a violation of § 201 if the official were a federal officer to avoid
expanding federal jurisdiction. It is not clear how the statute could be rewritten by
judicial interpretation of its terms when the provision reaches all types of
fraud-including the right of honest services under § 1346-and not just two-party
exchanges involving bribery and gratuities. As interpreted by the courts, § 1346
requires dishonesty in the exercise of authority resulting in an undeserved gain;
therefore, kickback schemes or other types of conduct to reap an improper reward
are subject to the criminal prohibition. Professor Beale also asserts that the Mail
Fraud statute is not applied to federal officials to the same extent that it is to state
and local officials, but that position may be mistaken. Id. at 717 ("To this point, the
honest services theory has seldom been applied in cases involving federal
officials."). There have been high-profile mail fraud prosecutions of members of
Congress, see United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (mail
fraud charges against former Representative Dan Rostenkowki, who chaired the
House Ways and Means Committee); In re Ford, 987 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1992)
(mail fraud charges against Representative Harold Ford); United States v. Biaggi,
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supports the exercise of congressional authority in § 1346 to permit federal
prosecution of a wide range of misconduct in all levels of government.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution contains provisions designed to prevent corruption in
the administration of the national government and, indirectly, structural
protections to limit the effects of corruption in the state governments. The
division of authority between the federal government and the states
operates on the assumption that each government will act properly,
although perhaps in its own self-interest, by advancing its own policies. Out
of the balance between federal and state power comes the protection of the
people.
That balance is skewed when corruption--the misuse of authority for
personal gain-taints the operation of any government. Federalism creates
a healthy competition, but it does not permit one level of government to
operate in a corrupt manner. The notion of federal prosecution of the
909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) (mail fraud charges against former Representative
Mario Biaggi); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (mail fraud
charges against Representative Charles Diggs); and congressional aides, see United
States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981). For mail fraud prosecutions against
officers of the executive branch, see United States v. Hubbell, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 1999), rev'd in part, 177 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (mail fraud charges
against former Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell); United States v.
Espy, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (mail fraud charges against former Secretary
of Agriculture Mike Espy); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
Cal., 964 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1997) (mail fraud charges involving scheme to
deprive employer of lobbyist of its right to honest services related to gratuities paid
to former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy).
While there are more prosecutions of state and local officials involving § 1346
than prosecutions of federal officials, that may reflect the large disparity in the
number of officials at different levels of government and the fact that greater
economic interests that might attract corrupting parties are at stake in decisions by
local governments, such as zoning, condemnation, service contracts, etc. There
does not appear to be any evidence that the government is creating a different
threshold for violating § 1346 based on the level of government at which the
corruption occurred. Moreover, the view that the federal government is somehow
policing only ethical violations that are at best questionably criminal has little
support in the cases. For example, in United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 728 (1 st
Cir. 1996), the charges against the lobbyist for his gifts to a state legislator were
much more than mere ethical lapses but involved significant corruption of the
political process.
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corrupt use of power by any official, federal or state, protects the benefits
afforded by the division of power under federalism. The constitutional
design does not create wholly separate spheres of authority, at least not in
a way that would shield from federal prosecution state officers' abuse of
authority for personal gain. The Anti-Corruption Legacy of the Constitution
makes it clear that the federal statutes used to prosecute corruption at all
levels of government comply with federalism by ensuring that the balance
between the states and the national government remains a healthy
competition, not one tainted by the improper exercise of official authority.
